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COLORADO'S PROGRAM TO IMPROVE
COURT ADMINISTRATION
By

JUSTICE WILLIAM

E.

DOYLE*

After one full year of operational experience with a judicial department, the great value of this staff service in solving delay, congestion and other modern day court problems must be acknowledged. Among its many functions is the important one of conducting surveys and investigations looking to a more just and speedy
determination of cases. In addition, it serves as a focal point for
mobilizing interested community groups such as the law schools,
members of the bar, the bar associations, the public relations media,
labor and business associations, etc., cooperation of which are essential to success in a long range improvement program. In Colorado
this department has become a non-substantive research arm of the
Supreme Court and this experiment has proven and is proving of
great value.
The apprehensions expressed by some that adoption of such a
system would mechanize the judicial process have not come to pass.
Experience has shown the contrary to be true and that instead of
interfering with careful and painstaking consideration and determination of cases, a system of administration relieves the judge of
preoccupation with detail so that he can give undivided attention
to the cases.
The story of adoption of the judicial department, which must
include the prior background, the forces which brought it about, and
an analysis of the progress which has resulted, may be of practical
value in those states which have problems similar to ours in Colorado.
Adoption of a system of court administration has been one part
of a broad effort to improve the administration of justice in Colorado. This aspect of the program has been within the present institutional system. Equally important, however, has been the long
range program of court reform looking to adoption of a new judicial
article. This movement has been spearheaded by the Legislative
Council's Committee on the Administration of Justice. Some attention will be here given to the legislative attack, but the most space
will be devoted to the functioning of our judicial department.
The views and comments expressed herein are conclusions of
the author and not necessarily of the court of which he is a member.
I.

CAUSES OF COURT CONGESTION

Colorado has had and continues to have a phenomenal post-war
growth. The last decade has witnessed a population growth from
1,325,089 in 1950 to 1,735,315 in 1960. The increase in population
does not tell the entire story. Colorado is a relatively large state
and the population is concentrated in the area on either side of the
Continental Divide. This has added to the problem. The urban areas
have experienced the large gains while the rural areas have re*Associate
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mained more or less static. Very little was done to relieve the court
congestion which resulted from this unforeseen growth until 1957,
and by that time the backlog had become substantial. In 1957 there
were over 200 appeals at issue and undecided in the Colorado Supreme Court.' The waiting period from date of issue until date of
decision was two years. The volume of filings steadily increased,
apparently stimulated by the delay. A similar delay of two years
from date of issue until trial existed at the district court level (at
least in the densely populated areas).
While the problem was developing there had been some recognition of it by the General Assembly and other groups; however, this
did not result in the adoption of any broadscale program. Additional
judges were from time to time provided and new judicial districts
were created, but it was not until the problem had become a minor
crisis that any positive steps toward solving it were developed.
II. THE PRESENT JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK
Our court system has grown and spread indiscriminately since
it was originally created with the adoption of the Judicial Article
of the Constitution of Colorado in the year 1876.2 The original constitutional provisions remain, but in addition, there have been new
courts created and new amendments added as conditions have demanded. For example, we have had an intermediate appellate court
which was later abolished. A juvenile court has been added in Denver. There has been an increase in the number of Supreme Court
Justices and the General Assembly has created a superior court, an
auxiliary court in Denver.
Apart, however, from these additions, the three basic constitutional courts remain: the Supreme Court,3 which exercises appellate jurisdiction, the district courts, 4 the courts of general and unlimited jurisdiction, and the county courts5 which are the probate
courts but also have a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. In addition, the General Assembly is empowered to create justices of the
peace, municipal courts and police magistrates.
The Supreme Court's power includes review of final judgments
of the district and county courts, together with the power to entertain original extraordinary writs." It may also render supervisory
opinions.7 The original Judicial Article gave the Supreme Court
authority to supervise all inferior courts "under such regulations
and limitations as may be prescribed by law." The provision has
not, however, been implemented or used until quite recently. The
Supreme Court Justices are elected on a partisan basis for 10 year
terms.
The district courts are organized upon the basis of judicial districts, some of which are coextensive with county boundaries and
some of which encompass several counties.8 The judges are elected
1 1959 Colo. Judicial Administrator Ann. Rep. 12 [hereinafter cited as 1959 Ann. Rep.].
2 Colo. Const. art. VI.
3 Colo. Const. art. VI,
2.
4 Colo. Const. art. VI,
11.
5 Colo. Const. art. VI, * 23.
( Colo. Const. art. VI,
3.
7 Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3.
8 1959 Ann. Rep. 1.
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on a partisan basis for 6 year terms from judicial districtsY There
are now 18 districts and 39 district judges. The great variation in
population from district to district creates a substantial disproportion with respect to the ratio of judges to population. For example,
Denver has a population of about 500,000 and has 10 judges, whereas
the smallest of these districts has a population of approximately
14,000.10
There are 63 counties and 63 county judges, each of whom is
elected for a 4 year term." These judges are paid upon the basis of
the population within the county and are also required or not required to be lawyers depending on the population within the
county.12 Most of the county judges are not lawyers. Final judgments of the county court can be reviewed in the Supreme Court,
or, in the alternative, may be appealed and a trial de novo had in
the district court.
13
We now have an estimated 278 elected justices of the peace.
14
They are elected for 2 year terms, and are paid on a fee basis. 15
They exercise a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction and appeals
from their judgments
may be taken to the county where a trial de
16
novo is available.
Despite the fact that the above-described system is loose jointed,
unintegrated, duplicative and that it offers much more due process
than is necessary under organic law or as a matter of fair play, and
notwithstanding that a new judicial article would be helpful, the
failure to adopt a new court system has not been the responsible
factor in the rise of the docket congestion problem. While this has
undoubtedly affected the general efficiency of the system and although a new and improved amendment would furnish necessary
tone, it is impossible to see any substantial relationship between the
outmoded constitutional provision and the docket congestion. After
all, the framers (in 1876) did place the responsibility on the Supreme Court to supervise the court system. The failure of the Court
to assume responsibility when the congestion became apparent was
one effective cause.
Colo. Const. art. VI, § 12.
1959 Ann. Rep. (Appendix I).
Colo. Const. art. VI, § 22.
Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, c. 44, § 4; Colo. Sess. Laws 1960, c. 40, § 11; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-5-22
(Supp. 1957).
13 1959 Ann. Rep. 4.
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 49-1-6(3) (Supp. 1957).
15 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 56-2-13 (Supp. 1957).
16 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 79-13-1 (1953).
9
10
11
12
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III. OFFICIAL RECOGNITION THAT A PROBLEM EXISTED
Everyone will agree that court reform is more difficult to
achieve than other governmental improvements. This is very evident from the frustrating slowness and laboriousness which attends
such efforts in the face of obvious need. The responsible factor is
probably the traditional independence and also the conservativeness
of the judiciary. Judges are quite properly insulated from outside
pressures and this insulation has had its effect not only in the area
of decisions but also with respect to improving administration. In
view of this, the need for leadership from the courts is the more
apparent. Unless the judges themselves initiate improvements the
chances of their becoming realities are lessened. This was true in
our state. While the years of effort on the part of the bar and other
groups are not to be discounted as influences, nevertheless no broadscale program was able to get off the ground until the Supreme
Court itself initiated it.
The first meaningful step was taken in 1957 by the then Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, 0. Otto Moore. Soon after assuming
the chair of Chief Justice he asked the Governor to create a Judicial
Council for the purpose of studying the problem. After that the
Governor appointed a Judicial Council of 29 lawyers and judges.
The Governor's action was subsequently confirmed by the General
Assembly and money was appropriated for the work of the Council.
The Assembly directed the Council to make a survey and to report
on or before December 15, 1958. Everything which has been accomplished stems from this group. This Council divided into committees
and made studies in a number of fields including (1) the desirability
of eliminating a review step in the field of administrative decisions,
(2) desirability of abolishing the trial de novo in appeals from the
county court to the district court, (3) methods of solving the district
court deadlock, and (4) some methods for solving the Supreme
Court deadlock.
The subsequent studies of the Council and its recommendations
furnished a background for the General Assembly to adopt the various measures for obtaining reliable data and for taking positive
steps to improve the judicial system. The statutes which were subsequently passed included:
1. Joint Resolution No. 16.17 This measure created a study committee composed of 12 members of the House and Senate, which was
called the Committee on the Administration of Justice. Money was
appropriated for the employment of a professional staff and authority was given to conduct a thorough survey on the entire field
of "administration of justice," including the organization of all
courts and judicial services, the criminal code and code of criminal
procedure. The committee immediately appointed an advisory group
composed of representatives of the Supreme Court and district court,
the law schools and the bar associations. It proceeded to conduct
its own survey of court conditions and to hold public hearings in all
parts of the state. Following its year-long study, the committee
proposed numerous legislative measures dealing with various aspects, substantive as well as procedural problems, including a pro17 Cclo. Sess. tcws 1959, p. 924.
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posed new judicial article. 18 This unit is continuing and has for its
immediate objective the reorganization of the courts by adoption of
a new constitutional amendment. The details of the proposed
amendment are unimportant here. It is sufficient to mention that
the proposal seeks to integrate the court system and to eliminate
duplications. The proponent's philosophy is that fewer but better
qualified courts will improve the quality and the efficiency of judicial administration.
2. A second important enactment created the Judicial Department headed by a Judicial Administrator. 19 This will be hereinafter
considered in some detail.
3. Legislation provided for some new district judgeships in the
more congested areas.
4. An act that authorized the appointment of law clerks in the
Supreme Court.
The above are the more important judicial statutes which were
passed in 1959. There were others, such as the authorization directed
to the Supreme Court to adopt rules of criminal procedure.
IV.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

The most significant of the measures passed by the Assembly
was the Judicial Reform Act of 1959.20 This was modeled after the
federal statute in that it created a department system for the supervision of the trial courts. The Act established a Judicial Department
"for the supervision of all courts of record in the State of Colorado."
It divided the state into departments to be supervised by individual
Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and created the office of
Judicial Administrator. It provided that he is appointed by and
serves at the will of the Justices of the Supreme Court. His duties,
as declared in the statute, include the development of a reporting
system with respect to pending cases in all courts of record. He is
also required to analyze and study the reports, thus obtaining and
determining which courts are in need of additional judges "so that
litigants of this state shall receive just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all causes pending. ..

."

He is also required to report

his findings to the Chief Justice so that accumulated business can
be disposed of by calling to the congested areas judges from other
areas. The Act also provided for an Annual Judicial Conference
looking to improved methods for transacting business within each
department.
The Departmental Justice was authorized to install a reporting
system within his department to examine dockets, records and proceedings in the courts under his supervision, and the judges and
clerks of the district courts are required to furnish information requested.
Undoubtedly the most important aspect of a program such as
this is the appointment of a competent Administrator. To be successful in such an endeavor many qualities are required. The most
important of these are dedication, energy, drive, selflessness, and
perhaps less important, diplomacy. One reason for the high degree
18 H.R. Con. Res. 6, 42d General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1960).
19 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 93, § 1.
20 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 93, § 1-2.
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of success achieved during the first year was the fact that we were
fortunate enough to have an administrator with these qualities.
Clyde 0. Martz, Assistant Dean of the University of Colorado Law
School, took the position for a one year period. He has been succeeded by an equally qualified man, Professor James R. Carrigan,
who had been on the teaching staff of New York University Law
School, the University of Denver College of Law and the University
of Washington Law School. The uncompromising approach of both
of these men is producing a tradition which should insure a continuous high level of court administration.
Immediately after his appointment, the first Administrator2 1
commenced a long term study of the various courts of the state.
He sent forms to the clerks requesting information as to cases pending at the start of the requested period, new cases docketed and the
number and nature of dispositions, together with the age of cases
pending at the end of the period. He used another technique, which
was to obtain a short term analysis of time spent by individual
judges. These original reports and the continuing reports have
furnished invaluable data useful in recommending new judgeships,
in making temporary assignments and in projecting future problems. Similar data has been obtained from other courts, including
the county, juvenile and superior courts. The work of the Administrator, has not, however, stopped with statistic gathering. He has
also engaged in a variety of research work, including the following:
1. Supervision of the publication of comprehensive court manuals for the district and county courts. These manuals contain procedural directions and forms and are designed to promote uniform
procedural practices. The County Court Manual was prepared by a
research and writing team composed of prominent judges, attorneys,
professors of law from the University of Denver, and county court
clerks. The District Court Clerks Manual was a project of the University of Denver Law Center and was prepared by an outstanding
research and writing team. The Administrator was instrumental in
the physical work of editing and arranging the manuals which were
published and will be maintained and distributed by the Judicial
Department.
2. Assistance to the Supreme Court in connection with its rule
making duties. The Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated
in 1941 and many of them require amendment. Justices have found
it impossible, what with the great backlog of pending cases, to devote themselves to this type of work. The Judicial Department has
researched the problem and furnished necessary drafts which will
ultimately lead to promulgation of improved Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Submission of a draft set of rules of criminal procedure to
the Supreme Court for its consideration. The Administrator, in conjunction with a committee of the Colorado Bar Association, drafted
such rules fashioned after the federal rules. The Court has the
legislative duty to promulgate Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Court's task is greatly simplified when it has a draft set of rules
from which to work.
21 The following description of the activities of the Administrator is based on the detailed account
in the 1959 Annual Report of the Judicial Administrator.
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4. Analyzation of the Supreme Court's backlog of cases. This
and the grouping of similar cases has substantially aided the case
disposition rate.
V.

REDUCTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT BACKLOG

The mere existence of the Judicial Department as a clearing
house for information with respect to the need for additional judicial help has made a great contribution to the solution of the congestion problem. The individual districts, acting through their presiding judges, have customarily requested judicial help by notifying
the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court. Normally these requests are filled on a completely informal basis. The Administrator
has information which permits him to communicate directly with a
judge who has available time to assist in another district, so the Administrator is usually successful in filling these requests without
communicating with the Departmental Justice. Sometimes this latter procedure is necessary. In the very short time that the system
has been operating the waiting period has been reduced from a high
of 2 years, which existed just prior to the appointment of the Administrator, to approximately 6 months at the present time.
In the busiest court, the district court for the City and County
of Denver, business machine methods have been installed so that
information is maintained on an up-to-date basis.
It is not fair to attribute the improvement entirely to the work
of the Judicial Department. First, there has been a high degree of
cooperation and hard work by the judges. This has been the most
important single factor. Secondly, there have been improvements
in the operation of the master docket. The presiding judge has acquired more authority in the making of assignments and preventing
continuances. Thirdly, the pre-trial conference has been more widely used and it is generally agreed that this has been a successful
procedure in increasing settlements and reducing the docket. The
rule of civil procedure providing for a mandatory pre-trial conference has not yet been adopted. However, in his report, the Judicial
Administrator recommended:
Civil Rule 16 should be amended to prescribe the scope
of pre-trial preparation, outline conference procedures and
establish sanctions for lack of preparation and lack of candor by participants in the conference. Uniform local rules,
complementing the Revised Rule 16, should provide form
pre-trial notices, form pre-trial orders and detailed procedures. By state rule pre-trial should be made mandatory
in contested civil cases except where waived for good cause
shown by written order of the judge. Without these changes
pre-trial conferences will continue to be conducted sporadically, often on the day of trial, and without accomplishing
the savings in time and litigation expense contemplated in
their use. With these changes, the judges and attorneys
will have confidence that the Supreme Court will enforce

SIECHS-LIWLO- CORPORATIOn SEALS- ALPInE 5-3422
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pre-trial orders and attorneys can reasonably expect full
the supervision of the trial court during
disclosure under
22
conference.

It is not certain that the mandatory pre-trial rule will be adopted but some change in Rule 16 looking to more effective use of the
pre-trial conference is likely. Whether the pre-trial should be mandatory is open to question. A present New Jersey study is seeking
the answer whether pre-trial is helpful in all cases. The results of
this survey may influence our Rule 16 changes.
When the system of administration was first adopted it was
viewed with some apprehension by the district courts and also by
the court clerks. It now has more acceptance. The judges and the
clerks recognize that it is designed to help conduct a continuing self
survey of the work of the courts and they recognize that this is desirable.
VI.

REDUCTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BACKLOG

The need for study and survey of the Supreme Court practice
has been more apparent than survey of the district courts because
the backlog of undecided cases has been continuously increasing for
almost 10 years. Various suggestions have been made to solve this.
Most of them have dealt with methods for decreasing the traffic
either through a system of discretionary review or through an intermediate court. Neither method is at the moment practical and
consequently some kind of short term relief was essential. The following steps have been taken:
1. Employment of Law Clerks for the Justices. The Assembly
had authorized employment of law clerks in 1904, but this had
never been implemented by appropriation and there was no evidence that the Justices ever requested it. Enactment of a law authorizing each Justice to appoint a law clerk has improved the
quality as well as the quantity of work.
2. Departmental Hearings. During the regime of Chief Justice
Francis Knauss, the Court reinstituted the practice of hearing and
deciding cases in three judge departments instead of en banc. This
approach has been long authorized by Article VI, Sec. 5 of the Colorado Constitution, and has been utilized during various periods of
the Court's existence, but it had fallen into disuse during the past
decade. The Constitution provides that there must be three judges
concurring in department cases and also provides: "....

no case in-

volving a construction of the constitution of this state or of
23 the
All
United States, shall be decided except by the court en banc.
cases are now assigned to departments except those involving constitutional questions and cases of great public importance. The
Chief Justice determines whether a case is to be assigned to a department or to the full Court and he also determines the membership within departments. At first an effort was made to establish
fixed membership within departments, but now the composition is
completely flexible. This latter approach has proven better.
22 1959 Ann. Rep. 41.
23 Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5.
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4. Oral Arguments. A third step taken was adoption of a rule
requiring oral arguments in all cases with the exception of original
proceedings and criminal appeals pro se.
5. Use of Outside Judges. The Legislative Council Committee
on the Administration of Justice recommended that money be appropriated to employ district court judges, former Supreme Court
judges and qualified county judges to aid in the drafting of opinions.
24
The Assembly responded by authorizing funds in its 1960 session.
Now trial court judges are frequently participants in department
hearings following which drafts of opinions are submitted and, as
modified, are adopted per curiam.
The past Chief Justice, Leonard v. B. Sutton, refined and developed all of the above improvements and added others, including
extensive use of the outside judges and of long term docket planning. All of this promises to reduce the Court's backlog by as many
as 100 cases per year.
As a result of the described improvements, the number of cases
at issue and ready for disposition had declined from a high of 331
as of October, 1959 to approximately 270 as of October, 1960. The
number of pending cases had been reduced from 538 as of October
1, 1959 to approximately 450 as of October, 1960. The waiting period between the date of issue and date of final disposition had been
reduced from 2 years to approximately 14 months. In the year 1960
there were 370 cases disposed of on written opinion and many other
dispositions by order. On the present basis, it is estimated that the
Supreme Court will be on a current basis at some time in the early
part of 1962.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The enthusiasm of the foregoing remarks on judicial administration must not be construed as expressing belief that organic court
reform is not essential. On the contrary, the system will never work
at maximum efficiency until a modern vehicle has been substituted
for the 1876 model. Since in our case a new amendment was not
forthcoming it was necessary to utilize the old equipment to the best
possible advantage. Our experience has shown that there can be
limited progress even in these circumstances. Our experience has
shown also that:
1. The Judicial Administrator can be trusted to perform responsible tasks. He should not be a mere super clerk or statistics
gatherer. He should at long last receive recognition as a highly
trained professional capable of rendering intelligent service in a
broad area. He should be awarded more responsible and more meaningful tasks.
2. The Administrator must, of course, work under the guidance
of the judges. The judges must assume leadership, initiative and
must finally make the decisions in any court reform program or in
any system of court administration. This can not be left to the General Assembly, the Bar Association, or to any other person or group.
No influence outside the judiciary can effectively tell the courts how
to run their business. If the courts fail to move there will be little
in the way of court improvements.
24 Colo. Sess. Lows 1960, c. 38, § 1-6.
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3. It is finally submitted that the great contribution which a
system of judicial administration can make is to provide a facility
for continuous self analysis and self study. It gives the courts an objective picture of how they are doing. The trouble spots appear at
once and can be corrected before they become difficult problems.
If the plan operates with imagination and vigor it should provide
essential tone and should serve as effective preventive medicine
against arteriosclerosis, a disease to which judicial systems seem
peculiarly susceptible.
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DRAFTING A SECTION 2503(c) TRUST
FOR A MINOR**
By HovER T.

LENTZ*

It is more blessed to give than to receive, and the more so, if the
gift is blessed by the tax laws. Paradoxically, the very solicitude
of the law in protecting minors and their property resulted in placing minors at a serious tax disadvantage insofar as the receipt of
gifts was concerned. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has removed several of the curses which formerly plagued would-be donors and their counsel, and a favorable start has been made in fostering gifts to minors by the extension of a partial tax blessing to such
gifts.
I.

HISTORICAL AND

CURRENT

BACKGROUND ON THE FUTURE INTEREST

PROBLEM
Before analyzing the new provisions of the 1954 Code relating
to gifts to minors and attempting to draft a trust instrument qualifying for their benefits, it is necessary to examine the prior law,
first, in order to appraise and interpret the new rules, and, second,
because the new law merely extends and does not repeal the old,
and therefore much of the old is still to be reckoned with today.
Since its inception in 1932, the Federal gift tax law has provided for the annual exclusion of certain amounts from the category of
taxable gifts. Section 1003 (b) of the 1939 Code and Section 2503 (b)
of the 1954 Code allow an annual exclusion from gift tax in the
amount of $3,000 for all gifts "other than gifts of future interests in
property."
With the estate tax rates reaching as high as 77% and with income rates attaining a maximum of 91%, both in steep progression,
the urge has been irresistible to reduce these tax burdens by gifts
of property to those objects of the donor's bounty who have smaller
estates and lower incomes. The objective becomes particularly attractive if the goal can be attained without incurring a gift tax.
While the use of the $30,000 lifetime specific exemption' available
to every donor is important in avoiding gift tax, the full use of the
annual exclusion greatly increases the benefits to be realized from
gifts. Therefore, it is advisable, at least from the tax viewpoint, to
make certain that a gift is not denominated a "future interest."
The problem is essentially one of definition. The meaning of
the phrase "future interest" has gradually evolved through a long
series of decisions, an unusual number of which have been rendered
by the United States Supreme Court.
The Committee Reports under the Revenue Act of 1932 stated
that the term meant "any interest or estate, whether vested or contingent, limited to commence in possession or enjoyment at a future
**This is a revision of an article by Mr. Lentz that appeared in the 1956 Major Tax Planning
volume, sponsored by the University of Southern California, published by Mathew Bender & Co.
*Mr. Lentz is a member of the Denver firm of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard. He is
past Secretary of the Section of Taxation of the ABA and past chairman of the Federal Estate and
Gift Tax Committee of the Section of Taxation of the ABA.
1 Int.Rev. Code of 1954, § 2521.
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date." The reason for restricting the exclusion to transfers of present interests was said to be the "apprehended difficulty, in many
instances, of determining the number of eventual donees and the
values of their respective gifts."
In a leading case 2 the Supreme Court remarked:
These terms are not words of art, like "fee" in the law of
seizin,

. .

.but connote the right to substantial present eco-

nomic benefit. The question is of time, not when title vests,
but when enjoyment begins. Whatever puts the barrier of
a substantial period between the will of the beneficiary or
donee now to enjoy what has been given him and that enjoyment makes the gift one of a future interest within the
meaning of the regulation.
These various definitions, however, must be applied to specific factual situations. A veritable welter of cases has arisen, particularly
when one considers that the question is relatively insignificant
from a revenue standpoint. These cases dealing primarily with
gifts in trust have resulted in an illogical pattern, much of which
is still fully applicable under the 1954 Code.
It is the individual beneficiary, not the trustee, to whom the
gift is made and the annual exclusion is applicable. 3 Where the
trustee was directed to accumulate the income and to distribute the
accumulated income and the principal at a future time, the beneficiary's interest in both the income and the principal were deemed
future and the exclusion was denied. 4 Likewise, the exclusion was
lost when the trustee was given discretion to use income or principal
at any time for the benefit of the beneficiary. 5
Where current distribution of income was mandatory and only
the distribution of corpus was postponed to a later date, the courts
valued the income interest separately and treated it as a "present"
interest. The exclusion was allowed to the extent of the value of the
income interest, even though the gift of the principal was deemed
to be "future."6 The value of the income interest in such cases is
determined by actuarial
principles under tables provided in the
7
Treasury Regulations.

However, even in instances where all income was required to
be distributed currently the exclusion was sometimes denied. Almost in vain, the donors sought for a magic formula for making a
gift in trust, particularly for the benefit of minors, which would
pass the "future interest" hurdle and at the same time avoid the
donor's natural reluctance to vest full control of the property and
the income in immature and inexperienced donees. One proposed
solution to this dilemma, which for a brief time had some promise
of success, was the inclusion in the trust instrument of a clause
granting the minor beneficiary or his legally appointed guardian
the absolute and unrestricted right to demand that the trustees pay
over all accumulated income and corpus at any time and thereby
terminate the trust in whole or in part. In the reported cases, not
one legal guardian was actually appointed for a minor. This device
2 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
3 Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 398 (1941).
4 United States v. Peltzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941).
5 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 422 (1945).
6 Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
7 Treas. Reg. §20.2031-7.
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generally met with failure and the Commissioner continued to deny
the exclusion.8 Recently, the Commissioner allowed the annual exclusion under the 1939 Code where the trustee was required to use
trust income for the support, education and benefit of the minor as
though the trustee were holding as a guardian.9
The case law had reached such a discouraging state from a prospective donor's viewpoint that text writers direly predicted, 10 and
the Commissioner contended, albeit unsuccessfully," that even an
outright gift to a minor was a "future interest," since the minor
could not be said to presently possess and enjoy a stock certificate
or the title to a parcel of real estate.
The taxpayer's plight clearly needed some attention, and since
resort to the courts had only produced further confusion, legislative
action was the alternative.
II. PARTIAL SOLUTION PROVIDED By CONGRESS
In response to this widespread confusion and dissatisfaction and
the accompanying demands for clarifying legislation, Congress acted
on two fronts. It adopted Section 2503 (c) dealing specifically with
gifts to minors, and it added some language to Section 2503 (b) to
eliminate the incongruous result of the Evans and Brody cases.12
Section 2503 (c) provides that a gift in a prescribed form to a
minor is excluded from the future interest limitation. Congress
failed to come directly to grips with the basic "future interest" problem, and merely delineated a certain limited type of transfer as an
exception to the general rule. The pertinent part of the statute
states that:
No part of a gift to an individual who has not attained the
age of 21 years on the date of such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property ... if the prop-

perty and the income thereform (1) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee
before his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(2) will to the extent not so expended(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21
years, and
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age
of 21 years, be payable to the estate of the donee or
as he may appoint under a general power
of ap13
pointment as defined in section 2514 (c).

The statute was not intended to provide an exclusive method
of making gifts of present interests to minors. Therefore, prior law
will continue to govern transfers which do not comply with the
strict requirements of Section 2503 (c).14
8 Rev. Rul. 54-91, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 207.
44
9 Rev. Rul. 59-78, I.R.B. 1959-10, p.
following United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir.
1956).
10 Fleming. Gifts for the Benefit of Minors 49 Mich. L. Rev. 529 (1951).
11 John E. Daniels, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 147 (1952).
12 Evans v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1952); Jenny Brody, 19 T.C. 126 (1952).
13 See generally: Rabklin and Johnson, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation, §51.11(4);
Mertens, Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation, §§38.02, 38.03 and 38.20 (1959).
14 Treas. Reg. §25.2503-4(c) provides: "(c) A gift to a minor which does not satisfy the requirements of section 2503(c) may be either a present or a future interest under the general rules of
125.2503-3. Thus, for example, a transfer of property in trust with income required to be paid annually to a minor beneficiary and corpus to be distributed to him upon his attaining the age of
25 is a gift of a present interest with respect to the right to income but is a gift of a
future interest with respect to the right of corpus."
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It will be observed that the statute covers all types of gifts,
whether outright or in trust, to a guardian or otherwise, and that in
some respects the case law has been modified. For instance, it is no
longer necessary that income be distributed currently, as was the
case under the Fondren15 decision. However, there must be provisions for invasion of principal, the payment of income alone not being sufficient. In this respect the former rule, exemplified by the
Fisher16 and Sensenbrenner17 cases has been rejected.
Regulations interpreting this loosely drafted statute were very
slow in forthcoming. Proposed regulations were not published until
January 3, 1957, and these were not finalized until November 14,
1958.
III. PROBLEMS

A necessary consideration in planning a proposed trust is the
choice of a trustee. Since the corpus of a Section 2503 (c) trust will,
at least initially, be small, the use of a corporate trustee will generally not be practical. Of course, from the tax standpbint, a corporate trustee does not give rise to the many tax problems that present themselves if an individual trustee is named. There are no adverse income tax consequences if the donor is trustee. The only
situation where a donor-trustee will be taxed on the trust income is
when, and to the extent that, he actually applies trust income for
maintenance of the beneficiary, whom he is legally obligated to
support.' 8 The fact that the donor possesses the power as trustee to
accumulate or distribute income does not result in taxing it to him. 9
Nevertheless, the property will be included in his estate for estate
tax purposes if the donor is the trustee. In order to qualify under
Section 2503 (c) the trustee must have full power to distribute all
principal, and, therefore, to terminate the trust. Possession of such
a power would sweep the corpus into the donor-trustee's gross
estate under Section 2038 (a) (1),20 which taxes trusts with a retained power to terminate in the settlor. In common law states
there are no tax dangers in naming the donor's wife as trustee, except that she may be taxed on the income actually used to support
the minor child, if under state law, the wife has a legal obligation
to support such child. In a community property state the wife should
not be trustee because she would be considered as a donor. The selection of the minor beneficiary's adult brother or sister would present no tax problems.
Clearly, the trustees can possess the required discretion to expend the income and principal for the minor's benefit. Such discretion cannot be vested in someone in a non-fiduciary capacity, such
as the minor himself, his parent, another relative, his guardian, or
merely a friend.
An equally important consideration is the choice of property
to be transferred to the trust. Often it will be desirable to transfer
property which is currently non-income producing, such as closely
15 Fondren v. Commissioner 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
16 Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
17 Sensenbrenner v. Commisisoner, 234 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943).
18 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §677(b).
19 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, 4§674(b)(s), 674(b)(7) and 677.
20 Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
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held stock or land. This would appear to be permissible as long as
the trustee is not directed by the terms of the trust to retain such
property. Although urged to do so, the Treasury did not cover this

point in the regulations. Previously the Service has issued favorable
rulings to the effect that gifts to Section 2503 (c) trusts of life insurance policies and subsequent cash gifts to pay premiums thereon
qualify for the exclusion. Such rulings covered both policies on the
trust beneficiary's life and policies on the life of the parent of the
beneficiary. Recently the Service has decided to reconsider this
position. The statute states that the trust property and the income
therefrom "may be expended by, or for the benefit of" the trust
beneficiary. The issue now troubling the Service appears to be
whether a portion of the cash gifts attributable to the cost of pure
insurance and not reflected in an increase in cash surrender value
is an expenditure for the "benefit" of the beneficiary. It may be
necessary to distinguish between situations in which the life insurance is on the life of the beneficiary's parent or on the beneficiary's
life. In the former, it can be argued that the funds were expended
for the benefit of the beneficiary, who is thereby protected against
loss of his parent, while in the latter the benefit may be to the beneficiary's successors in interest or his heirs, rather than to the beneficiary himself.
What standards, if any, may be imposed upon the exercise of
the trustee's discretion to distribute or accumulate income or to invade corpus? The statute merely states that the "property and the
income therefrom may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the
donee." There should be no limitations or fixed standards on the
trustee's discretion. The proposed regulations would have allowed
standards of "support, health or education" provided that the exercise of such discretionary authority by the trustee might not be exercised so as to deny the donee the right to the property or income
in case of "need." This was changed in the final regulations to provide that a transfer will not fail to qualify under Section 2503 (c) by
reason of the fact thatThere is left to the discretion of a trustee the determination
of the amounts, if any, of the income or property to be expended for the benefit of the minor and the purpose for
which the expenditure is to be made, provided there are no
substantial restrictions under the terms 21of the trust instrument on the exercise of such discretion.
It is this failure to permit standards governing distribution that
means it is not possible for the grantor to act as trustee without the
trust being included in his gross estate under the Lober decision. It
may be argued that a discretion to use income and principal for support of the minor inferentially relieves the father of his support obligations and, therefore, benefits the father as well as the minor. In
such event the trust would not be solely for the minor's benefit, and
the terms of Section 2503 (c) would be violated. Further, if the
father is trustee and in such capacity he has the power to use income and principal for his minor child's support, the father may be
deemed to have a general power of appointment for estate tax purposes, since he can, by exercise of such power, discharge his obliga21 Treaq. Reg. §25.2503-4(b)(1).
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tion to support. The trust would therefore be includable in the
father's gross estate under Section 2041.
The most serious drawback of a 2503 (c) trust is the necessity
of completely distributing the trust estate to the beneficiary at age
21. Many donors will refuse to make such a gift, preferring the loss
of the exclusion to the vesting of substantial sums in the beneficiary
at that age. Consequently, there has been considerable thought devoted to various methods of circumventing this requirement. The
statute provides that the property "pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years." Final regulations rather clearly state that
a transfer will not be disqualified because "the donee, upon reaching age 21, has the right to extend the term of the trust.

' 22

How-

ever, hopes that this would solve the problem were dashed almost
immediately by recent rulings. 23 These rulings dealt with a trust
providing that upon reaching 21 the donee could either compel immediate distribution of corpus or elect to extend the term of the
trust, in which case he would receive 1/3 of the corpus at 25, 1/3 at
29 and 1/3 at 33. It was originally held that the above quoted regulation was designed to permit extension by the donee only upon
such conditions as the donee may freely choose. Therefore, the trust
did not qualify. In the later ruling the rationale was switched to the
theory that the donee had not been given "the unequivocal and unconditional right to receive the property without any necessity for
affirmative action on his part." While these rulings are difficult to
22 Treas. Reg. §25.2503-4(b)(2).
23 Rev. Rul. 60-218, I.R.B.1960-23, p.12 superseding Rev. Rul. 59-144, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 249.

Questions to use inCOLORADO COURTS
A new work, Am Jur PROOF OF FACTS, phrases the actual
questions you should ask in direct examination ...gives
the answers you may expect.., helps you convince
judge and jury.
From A to Z it covers hundreds of important subjects
that arise constantly in your practice.

What is this new work like?
Use Volumes 1, 2, and 3 of PROOF OF FACTS absolutely
free for 30 days and see for yourself. Write either house
today.

BANCROFT-WHITNEY CO.
Streets
McAllister & Hyde
San Francisco 1, California

j

BENDER-MOSS CO.
M a r k e t S t re e
1 3 5 5
San Francisco 3, California

t

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

DICTA

1961

square with the regulation, they clearly indicate the dangers of including provisions extending the term of the trust after the donee
attains his majority.
What provisions should the trust contain with respect to the
disposition of the trust estate upon the minor's death prior to reaching 21? The statute merely tells us that to the extent the income
and principal are not expended during the minor's lifetime, they
must be "payable to the estate of the donee or as he may appoint
under a general power of appointment." A provision for the payment of all accumulated income and principal to the minor's estate
is clearly sufficient. It is doubtful whether a direct transfer to the
minor's heirs or legatees, without actual administration of the assets
in the minor's probate estate, is permissible. While the statutory
language left room to argue that the grant of a general power to
appoint by will plus a gift over to third persons in default of a valid
exercise of the power would satisfy Section 2503 (c) (2) (B), it was
generally felt that such a result would violate the congressional purpose to insure that no other person has an interest in the property.
In most states a minor can make a valid will, and thereby exercise
a testamentary power of appointment, if at all, only on reaching a
specified age, such as eighteen. Where the donee is under such age,
therefore, the takers in default will always receive the trust estate
at the minor's death. It was therefore feared that, where local law
prevented a minor from validly exercising a general power of appointment by deed or will, no gift over to a third person in default
of exercise of the power could be provided. Indeed, the proposed
regulations adopted this construction. Fortunately, the Treasury
heeded the many protests and the final regulations now contain the
following sentences:
However, if the minor is given a power of appointment exercisable during lifetime or is given a power of appointment
exercisable by will, the fact that under the local law a
minor is under a disability to exercise an intervivos power
or to execute a will does not cause the transfer to fail to
satisfy the conditions of section 2503 (c). Further, a transfer
does not fail to satisfy the conditions of section 2503 (c) by
reason of the mere fact that...
(3) The governing instrument contains a disposition
of the property or income not expended during the
donee's minority to persons other than the donee's
estate in the 24
event of the default of appointment
by the donee.

Therefore, it is possible (and of course desirable) to give the minor
donee a general testamentary power of appointment and then make
provisions for gifts over to third persons in default of its exercise.
These regulations do not permit any restrictions of substance by the
terms of the instrument on the exercise of the power but do permit
formal restrictions, such as a requirement that the will must specifically refer to the power being exercised, that the will must be
24 Treas.

Reg.

§25.2503-4(b).

In

the only decision to dote construing §2503(c)

the court denied

its application because the trust provided that the corpus would pass to the donee's descendants
or his brothers and sisters if he died prior to 21; the donee was not given any power of appointment. Bonnie M. Heath, 34 T.C. No.59.
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executed after the power was granted, that the document exercising
the power be filed with the trustee, etc.
There must be a separate trust for each donee. Several separate
trusts can, of course, be created by one trust instrument.
IV.

SUGGESTED PROVISIONS FOR SECTION

2503 (c)

TRUST

These provisions are drafted for a father who plans to create a
2503 (c) trust from his separate property for the benefit of his minor
daughter. He desires to name his wife as the trustee. It is believed
that the Service will rule that the following provisions meet all requirements of Section 2503 (c) and the regulations thereunder.
A. Dispositive Provisions
Section 1. The trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest
said property and any additional property which shall be added by
any person at any time in any manner to the trust herein created
(daughter of the settlor, born
for the sole benefit of
). The trustee may distribute to, or apply for the
, until she attains the age of twenty-one
sole benefit of,
(21) years, so much of the trust income or principal, or both, at such
time or times and in such amounts and manner as the trustee, in her
sole discretion, shall determine. Any amount which the trustee
shall determine not to use may be accumulated as income or may
be added to the principal, as the trustee shall deem best.
attains the age of twenty-one
Section 2. When
(21) years, this trust shall terminate, and the entire property then
remaining in trust (both principal and accumulated and accrued
income) shall be paid over and distributed to her, free and discharged of all trust.
die before attaining the age of
Section 3. Should
twenty-one (21) years, this trust shall terminate on her death, and
the entire property then remaining in trust (both principal and
accumulated and accrued income) shall be paid over and distributed
to such person or persons (including her estate or the creditors of
her estate) in such amounts and proportions and for such estates
and interests, and outright or upon such terms, trusts, conditions
may direct by her last will and
and limitations as
testament. Such general testamentary power of appointment shall
be exercisable only by her will which meets the requirements of a
under the laws of such state in
will in the State of
force at the date her will is executed, which will is duly admitted
to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction, and which will refers specifically to such power. So far as is possible, the laws of
such state shall govern the validity of interests created by the exercise of such power of appointment.
die before attaining the age
Section 4. Should
of twenty-one (21) years and without validly exercising the general testamentary power of appointment granted to her under Section 3 above, the trustee shall pay over and distribute the entire
property then remaining in trust (both principal and accumulated
and accrued income):
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(a) In equal shares free and discharged of all trust to
the settlor's children who are then living; provided, however, that if any such child is then under the age of twentyone (21) years, then in lieu of outright distribution of such
share to such minor child, such share shall be added to the
principal of a similar trust created by the settlor for the
benefit of such child and shall be held, administered and
distributed as a part thereof; and
(b) If none of such children is then living, then to the
person or persons who shall be appointed to administer
's estate, to be disposed of as a part of such
estate.
B. Irrevocable Trust
This trust is irrevocable and the settlor shall have no right
whatsoever to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate this trust, in whole
or in part. It is the settlor's intention that the trust income shall not
be considered his income for income tax purposes and that no part
of the trust shall be included in his gross estate for estate or inheritance tax purposes, and therefore, the settlor shall have the
right at any time to release, renounce, or disclaim any right, power
or interest which might be construed or deemed to defeat such intention. Neither the creation of this trust nor any distribution of
income or principal hereof shall be deemed or considered to discharge or relieve the parents of
from their legal obligation to support and educate her.
C. Spendthrift Clause
The interest of any beneficiary in the income or principal of
this trust shall be free from the control or interference of any creditor of a beneficiary or any spouse of a married beneficiary, and shall
not be subject to attachment
or other legal process or susceptible of
25
anticipation or alienation.
D. Powers of the Trustee
In the interest of brevity the general powers of the trustee
are not set forth. Commingling of trust assets with assets of other
trusts should not be permitted, nor should the trustee be authorized
25 Presence of spendthrift clause does not create a future interest. Rev. Rul. 54-344, 1954-2 Cum.
Bull. 319.
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or directed to retain non-income producing assets or to invest in
such assets. In order to avoid taxation of the income to the donor
under Section 675 and 677, the following restrictions on the trustee's
power are suggested:
The foregoing powers are subject to the following restrictions:
no loans shall be made without full and adequate security being received and full current rates of interest being charged; all sales,
purchases, exchanges or other dealings with trust property shall be
made for full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth; and no part of the trust principal or income shall be applied
to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the life of
the grantor. No person, other than the trustee, shall have or exercise the power (a) to vote or direct the voting of any stock or securities of this trust, (b) to control the investment of property of
this trust either by directing investments or reinvestments or (c)
to reacquire or exchange any property of this trust by substituting
other property of an equivalent value.
E. Manner of Making Distribution
The trustee may make any payments hereunder, directly to the
beneficiary, or to her legal guardian, or to the guardian of her person, or to any other person deemed suitable by the trustee, or by
direct payment of such beneficiary's expenses.
V.

OBTAINING RULING ON TRUST

Generally, a 2503 (c) trust will be used where the donor desires
to embark on a long term program of small annual gifts. It would
be most unfortunate for the donor to discover several years later
that the Commissioner refused to allow the annual exclusion. Not
only would back gift taxes and interest be due, but a new trust
would be needed for future gifts and, in addition, it would be necessary to continue administration of the old trust. Therefore, cautious
counsel may consider the advisability of making a nominal gift to
the trust on its creation, and then requesting an immediate ruling
as to whether the trust qualifies under Section 2503 (c).
When making gifts of closely held stock, it might be advisable
to make annual gifts in amounts slightly in excess of the $3,000 exclusion and accordingly pay a small tax in order that protection may
be claimed under 2504 (c) against a subsequent revaluation of the
transferred assets by the Service. This is particularly useful where
values are susceptible of wide differences of opinion between the
taxpayer and the government. Although the application of 2504 (c)
will not prevent a later claim by the government that no exclusion
was allowable in the prior year, the necessity of filing a return if
the gift exceeds $3,000 would commence the running of the statute
of limitations.
VI.

SECTION

2503 (b)

TRUSTS

In addition to treating gifts to minors in the 1954 Code, Congress
repealed the rule of the Evans case by inserting the following sentence in Section 2503 (b):
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Where there has been a transfer to any person of a present
interest in property, the possibility that such interest may
be diminished by the exercise of a power shall be disregarded in applying this subsection, if no part of such interest will at any time pass to any other person.
An example contained in the Finance Committee Report illustrates
the application of this language. Suppose a trust is created with income payable to A for life, remainder to B, and the trustee is given
uncontrolled discretion to pay all or any part of the principal to A
at any time. Under the Evans decision, A's income right would be
a future interest, since its value is indeterminate in view of the
trustee's power to invade principal. Under 2503 (b), however, this
would be a present interest entitled to the annual exclusion. A's
income interest may be diminished by exercise of the power to invade principal, but nothing passes to any third person. A possible
unintended result of this change, though, is that a trust permitting
discretionary accumulation of income will qualify in part as a
present interest, so long as no other person has any interest in the
property. Thus, the Fondren case may be legislatively overruled.
VII.

NoN-TRUST GIFTS TO MINORS

Persons who have made outright gifts to minors without intervention of a legal guardian, either in the face of or in ignorance of
the legal disabilities of a minor under state law, have generally
achieved favorable tax results.
Take the case of the father who gives shares of stock to his
minor child and registers the stock certificate in the child's own
name. It now has been settled that this transfer constitutes a present interest. The Internal Revenue Service has put an end to the
uncertainty over outright gifts by ruling that "an unqualified and
unrestricted gift to a minor, with or without the appointment of a
legal guardian, is a gift of a present interest. '26 Since the child is
the actual owner, the child, and not the father, will be taxed on the
dividends and profits from sales, even though such income is used
for the child's support. The child will receive the income tax benefits of his $600 exemption and the new dividend exclusion and credit.
The father can still claim the child as a dependent, if he continues
to furnish more than one-half of the child's support, until
the child
is 19, and thereafter, so long as the child is a student.27 These tax
benefits should be balanced against (a) the inconvenience of handling the property; (b) the necessity of appointing a legal guardian
in order to sell the stock; (c) thefact that the father may reacquire
the property by inheritance if the child dies before attaining the age
where he can make a will; and (d) the fact that the child will have
complete control of the property at the age of 21.
Another father, in order to avoid putting title in the minor's
name, might give shares of stock to his child and register them in
the mother's name as agent or nominee for the child. Presumably,
this would constitute a gift of a present interest, but it might be
held to be a future interest if there are some conditions or limita26 Rev. Rul.54-400, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 319; Beatrice B. Briggs, 34 T.C. No. 117.
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §151(e).
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tions on2 the mother's holding of title or on the application of the
income.

In the past few years a great deal of interest has been engendered by acts concerning gifts of securities to minors. The Model
Gifts of Securities to Minors Act originally sponsored by the New
York Stock Exchange and the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act have
been adopted in almost every state. Briefly, they create a form of
statutory trust and eliminate the necessity of a legal guardianship.
If the securities are in registered form, the donor makes the gift by
registering the stock in his own name "as custodian for
a minor" followed by the citation of the statute. With bearer securities, such as many types of bonds, the donor delivers the bonds
plus a deed of gift containing similar language to another family
member who will act as the custodian. Under the act the custodian
is granted full managerial powers. Generally speaking, the custodian has powers and duties similar to a guardian of the minor's
property, but of course, without the necessity of posting bond or of
accounting to a court or of obtaining court approval of purchases
and sales and expenditures for the minor.
Transfers under these custodian statutes will qualify under
Section 2503 (c) for the gift tax exclusion, and the income from
the custodianship property will be taxed to the minor. If the donor
is also custodian, the property will be included in his gross estate
if he dies before the minor attains 21.29
By their terms, the application of such statutes is limited to
transfers to a minor by gift made after adoption, and their use is
limited to securities. (The Uniform Act also permits cash gifts). In
view of their simplicity, they may well prove more popular than
Section 2503 (c) trusts. However a properly drafted trust has the
following advantages:
(1) initial gifts and later investments are not limited to securities;
(2) a broader choice of trustees and successor trustees is afforded;
(3) investments are not limited to the prudent man rule;
28 Madeleine N. Sharp, 3 T.C. 1062 (1944) (acq.); see Katherine Schuhmacher, 8 T.C. 453 (1947)
(acq.).
29 Rev. Rul. 59-357, I.R.B. 1959.44, p.18, holding that the income, estate and gift tax consequences of the Model Act and the Uniform Act are the same.
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(4) provision can be made for a gift over to third persons rather than to the minor's estate should the minor die before reaching
21, thus avoiding probate administration and possible return of the
property to the donor-parents through inheritance from the minor;
(5) accumulated income is taxed to the trust, not to the child;
and
(6) the uncertain application of various state laws (i.e. state of
the present or future domicile of the minor, donor or custodian or
state of incorporation of the company the stock of which is donated)
to the custodianship status are avoided.
Further, the cost of a 2503 (c) trust is not significant. The welladvised donor will generally choose the trust for the reasons mentioned and its greater flexibility and individuality.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Although Sections 2503 (b) and (c) represent an improvement
in the gift tax exclusion area, there is a need for further legislation.
The chief criticism against Section 2503 (c) has been directed to
its requirement that the property must pass outright to the donee
at twenty-one. There would appear to be no valid social or legal
reason compelling the selection of this age, and it is certainly contrary to the normal and understandable desires of most donors.
Some people feel that gifts to minors have now been granted an
undue advantage over gifts to adults.
The new language in Section 2503 (b) presents the anomalous
result that the longer the ultimate payment of principal is postponed, the larger the annual exclusion. For example, a trust granting income to A for life with remainder to B will have a larger exclusion than a transfer where A receives the income for only one
year and then receives the principal, although obviously A has a
more valuable right in the latter case.
One possible solution is to grant an exclusion to all gifts where
no third person has an interest in the property. If such were the
rule, the donor would be free to fix the time for ultimate principal
distribution at any future date, whether the beneficiary be a minor
or an adult.
To accomplish this result, the American Bar Association has
suggested the following language in lieu of present Section 2503 (c):
(c) Certain Transfers not Considered Future Interests
No part of a gift shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property for purposes of subsection (b) if the
property and the income therefrom will, to the extent not
distributed to or expended by, or for the benefit of, the
donee during his life, be payable on his death to his estate,
or as he may appoint under a general power of appointment as defined in Section 2514(c).30
In spite of this criticism, Section 2503 (c) with the liberal interpretations of the regulations gives the lawyer a handy form of trust
for modest gifts.
3O H.R. R-p. No. 10591 §61, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1960).
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MISCEGENATION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND SCIENCE
By

JEROLD
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CUMMINS AND JOHN
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"Any person, firm, or corporation who shall be guilty of printing, publishing, or circulating printed, typewritten, or written matter urging or presenting for public acceptance or general information, arguments or suggestions in favor of social equality or intermarriage between whites and negroes, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court." - Mississippi Code,
Section 2339 (1959)
"Men and Women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality,or religion have the right to marry and to found a
family."-Article 16.1 of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Miscegenation is a hydra-headed term. It can mean the marriage between persons of different races, or the genetic crossing of
races, or the sexual relations of two persons of different races. Our
use of the term will refer generally to the first meaning-marriage
between members of different races-and our concern is whether
miscegenation laws, i.e., laws forbidding such marriages, are within
the states' powers as they are limited by the United States Constitution.
Presently, there are twenty-three states which have such laws
on their books. 2 Our study will show that these statutes are not
based upon any scientific findings but that they are the result of
local prejudice. 3 Yet there have been only two instances in which
appellate courts have held such laws to be unconstitutional. 4 The
first case was decided in 1872 by the Alabama Supreme Court. The
court found that the Alabama miscegenation statute and the accompanying statute which punished anyone solemnizing the marriage
of a white person and a Negro were both in violation of the spirit
of the Fourteenth Amendment which, in their opinion, demanded
that any "persons who acquire citizenship under it shall not be distinguished from the former citizens for any of the causes, or any of
the grounds, which previously characterized their want of citizent

Mr. Cummins is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Law. Mr. Kane is a recent
graduate of the Univerity of Denver College of Low.
1 We apologize for using such an ill-sounding word. Since our outlook on the matter is one
of liberality, we would prefer the term "interracial marriage". Unfortunately, the word "miscegenation" is handier sometimes and is the commonly used term in the low. We bow to tradition
for the sake of convenience.
2 See Appendix I.
3 Only seven of the states are not of what is generally considered the South, and only one,
Delaware, is of the Northeast. The statement is premature, but we intend to demonstrate it.
4 Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). Harry
Bridges, a labor leader, made the headlines of the country's press when he attempted to marry a
Nisei in Nevada. He was at first refused a license, but a state district court ordered the issuance
of the license stating, "[T]he right to marry is the right of the individual, not the race . . . If
we are to take the proposition that all men are born free and equal seriously, then we can't very
well ignore the implications." Time, Dec. 22, 1958, p. 17. A Maryland statute which made it a
crime for a white woman to bear a Negro's child was held unconstitutional in State v. Howard,
2 R.R.L.R. 676 (Baltimore Crim. Ct. 1957), cited in Greenberg, Race Relations in American Low 346
(1959).
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ship."'5 "It cannot be supposed that this discrimination was otherwise than against the negro...."
The judicial climate in Alabama changed radically in 1877 when
the conviction of a party to a Negro-Caucasian marriage was upheld
and the former case expressly overruled. The court explained their
action by saying: "The natural law, which forbids their intermarriage and that amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races,
is as clearly divine as that which imparts to them different natures. '7 Later in the same year another case reached the Alabama
Supreme Court concerning the conviction of a Negro and a Caucasian who had married in 1875 upon the assurance of a probate
judge that the Supreme Court of Alabama had decided that the law
forbidding such a marriage was null and void. He gave them a
license authorizing any justice of the peace to marry them. The
court upheld their conviction (and a sentence of at least two years
in the penitentiary) and declared that ignorance of the law was no
excuse.' The decision is rather amgibuous on the latter point since
it is not clear whether "ignorance of the law" applied to the defendants or to the 1872 court. If the appellation applied to the defendants then it is obvious that the court was in error. It was not
a case of the defendants being ignorant of the law, but of being corrupted by the court's first decision which blinded them from perceiving that "clearly divine" natural law.
In 1948 Davis Knight, age twenty-three, was sentenced to five
years imprisonment by a Mississippi court for marrying a white
girl. His only Negro ancestor was a great-grandmother whom neither he nor his parents had known about.9 By all anthropological
criteria this person was a Caucasian, but not so according to the
law of Mississippi. Unfortunately, the persons who have been convicted under these laws are either ignorant of their existence or
they have not the means or the opportunity to move to a state whose
laws do not make them criminals. Such laws may also have disastrous side effects. The children may be illegitimate and disabled
from inheriting, 10 as well as the "spouse."" The right of a widow
5 Burns v. State, supro note 4, at 197.
6 Id. at 196.
7 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
8 Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877).
9 Time, Dec. 27, 1948, p. 18. The police were informed by a relative who, as the result of an
old family feud, dug up Knight's genealogy.
10 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §42-328 (1943); Greenhow v. James' Ex'r, 80 Va. 636 (1885).
11 Steven v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (20th Cir. 1944); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231
Pac. 483 (1924).
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to workmen's compensation may be denied. 12 Even the minister who
performs such a marriage may suffer.' 3 If the couple are not prosecuted 14they still may be persecuted by the police until they leave the
state.

II. HISTORY OF MISCEGENATION

Laws prohibiting marriage between certain races are relatively
modern when viewed on the time scale of western civilization. Although dominant nations have taken slaves and prohibited their citizens from intermarrying with them ever since the time of ancient
Egypt and ancient Babylon, 15 different cultures have treated the
matter as one of legal and social status rather than as being biologically harmful. Early Roman law, for instance, prohibited marriages
between the Patrician class and the Plebeians. 16 Hellenic Greece
and the Roman Empire had a master-slave economy in which marriage between the freeman and a slave was considered a social disgrace and it was usually prohibited. 17 The average freeman 18had
disdain for the slaves whether they were from Africa or Gaul.
The concept of race was undoubtedly first developed in America because of the institution of slavery which was largely confined
to a distinct African group whose physical appearance differed
greatly from the European settlers. To be sure, in pre-Columbian
history, man had always been identified as belonging to different
cultures, religions, distinct nationalities, and as having different
physical characteristics, "but strong as patriotism and national feeling might be, they did not think of themselves in terms of ethnology,
and, in making war for every other sort of reason, never made it
for the sake of imposing their own type of civilization ....
In none
of such cases did the thought of racial distinctions come to the
front."' 9
The first slaves were brought to the New World around 1510.
Historians have found that the slave commerce became so large that
the landowners in the West Indies and the American mainland could
no longer justify the barter and sale of human beings with the myth
that they were war captives and criminals. Public opinion in America and England began to grow against the slave trade as time went
on and there was increasing knowledge of the harsh conditions on
the plantations and the trip over from the African continent. Southern landowners found an answer to these objections in the theory
that Africans were subhuman and incapable of human feelings. The
same process can be seen in the settlement of Europeans in other
parts of the then expanding world. The intellectual concept of a
hierarchy of biological races grew and spread over the globe with
12 Rodriguez v. Utilities Eng'r & Constr. Co., 281 P.2d 946 (Okla. 1955).
13 See, e.g., Ark. Stats. Ann. 55-105 (1947).
14 For illustrations see Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 347-48 (1959).
15 The Code of Hammurabi provided that the master of a female slave could take her as a
concubine, but "that concubine shall not rank with his wife." The Code of Hammurabi, sec. 145
(Harper transl. 1904).
16 This was changed in 445 B.C. Hunter, Roman Law 688 (3d ed. 1897).
17 Id. at 683. There were some restrictions on marrying aliens also. See Devis, S., Race Relat'ons in Ancient Egypt 54 (1952).
18 Diller, Race Mixture Among the Greeks Before Alexandria (1937). Some had decided tastes,
however, in their choice of slaves. Cicero wrote to wealthy slave-owner friend Atticus: "Do not
obtain your slaves from Britain, because they are so stupid and so utterly incapable of being
taught that they are not fit to form part of the household of Athens." Quoted in Montagu, Man's
Most Dangerous Myth, 174 (3d ed. 1952).
19 Bryce, Race Sentiment as a Factor in History 26 (1925).
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the rise of colonization. It was an easy abstraction, because the inferior social status of the Negro and his different features and color
and his illiteracy lent credence to the idea of his being a different
biological species whose mind and body were not human.
The institution of Negro slavery was engendered by the spreading of colonialism. The attitude of the conqueror to the conquered
contributed to the efficacy of the institution because the conqueror
desired to maintain a stable society of essentially. imperialistic design. In Spanish-American colonies marriage between Spaniards
and Indians was at first forbidden, but as early as 1514 the ban was
lifted and such marriages were encouraged in hope that legitimate
unions would induce
the Spanish to make permanent settlements in
20
the New World.
Neither the common law of England nor its statutory law prohibited miscegenation. The earliest record we have of an English
colonial law barring racial amalgamation was in Jamestown in 1630.
In this instance it was ordered that a white man should be publicly
whipped before an assemblage of Negroes and whites "for abusing
himself to the dishonour of God and the
shame of Christians by de'21
filing his body in lying with a Negro."
Legal opposition against such relationships developed more
slowly in other colonies. The general custom and law of the time
gave a child the status of his mother, i.e., free or slave. Apparently
many of the immigrating English-women were marrying Negro
slaves due to the severe shortage of Negro women in the New World.
Thus the master lost the offspring of male slaves because they were
born into a freeman's status. In 1661 Maryland passed a law which
made such women slaves with their husbands, and made the children of the marriage slaves also. 22 This was not a miscegenation

statute since it did not outlaw the marriages, but it does reveal certain economic motives which presented themselves in that era's legislation. According to some historians, 23 it became a practice of
plantation owners to encourage marriages between the lower classes
of Europeans and the slaves in order to gain more slaves by their
progeny. Lord Baltimore soon put a halt to such penalties when he
learned that some of the servant girls he had sent over were being
made slave women. 24 In 1861 Maryland passed a statute placing a
penalty upon any master who would encourage a marriage between
a Negro slave and a European woman, but still the marriage was
recognized.25 Since the issue of such marriages were no longer slaves
because of Lord Baltimore's intervention, there was no interest on
20 Miscegenation 9 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 531.
21 Statutes at Large of Virginia, cited in Stonequist, Race Relations and Race Problems (Thompson
ed. 1939).
22 iAn farasmuch as divers freeborn English women, forgetful of their free condition, and to
the disgrace of our notion [note that the word race has not yet been adopted] do intermarry with
negro slaves, by which also divers suits may arise, touching the issue of such women. and a great
damage cloth befall the master of such nearoes, for preservation whereof for detering such freeborn women from such shameful matches, be it enacted; That whatsoever free-born women shall
intermarry with any slave, from and after the last day of the present assembly, shall serve the
master of such slave during the life of her husband: and that all the issues of such free-born
women so married shall be slaves as their fathers were. And be it further enacted: That all issues
of English or other free-born women, that have already married negroes,
shall serve the master
'
of their parents, till they be thirty years of age and no longer.
Proceedings of the General
Assembly of Maryland, 1637-1664, pp. 533-534. Quoted in Woodson, Beginnings of Miscegenation
of Whites and Blacks, 3 Journal of Negro History 339 (1918).
23 Calhoun, I., A Social History of the American Family 325 (1917), and McCormac, White Servitude in Maryland 68 (1904).
24 McCormac, op. cit. supra note 23, at 69.
25 Ibid.
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the part of the masters to encourage such unions. In fact, the Mulatto children became the burden of the master since they were the
legal children of his male slaves. When they reached a mature age
they were free to go. It became necssary to frame laws which compelled the white servant girls to reimburse the master for the costs
of supporting their children.2 6 Eventually marriage between the
two races was prohibited and severe penalties were inflicted upon
women who had illegitimate children by a person of another race.2 7
Similar development took place in other colonies. In 1691 Virginia enacted a statute which declared that any white person who
married with a Negro, Mulatto or Indian "shall within three months
after such marriage be banished and removed from this dominion
forever. '2 Eventually miscegenation laws were passed in nearly all
the colonies and in the nineteenth century a total of thirty-eight
states had at one time or another some kind of prohibition of interracial marriage. The laws were quite ineffective in preventing
interbreeding. 29 Illicit relations between the races were common
26 Id. at 70.
27 Dorsey, The General Public Statutory Law and Public Local Law of the State of Maryland,
from 1692-1839 at 79, cited in Woodson, op. cit. sup~ra note 22, at 349.
28 Ballagh, White Servitude in the Colony of Virginia 72-73 (1895).
29 The Pennsylvania miscegenation statute was passed in 1725; in 1780 the records of Chester
County showed that one-fifth of the Negro population was classified as Mulatto. By 1860 Mulattoes
constituted one-third of the Negro population of Pennsylvania. Statistics quoted by Woodson, op. cit.
supra note 22, at 338.
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occurrences in all the colonies. 30 Mulattoes were rapidly becoming
a numerous element in the American population.
After the Civil War the northern states began to repeal their
miscegenation laws, but most southern states found it desirable to
make theirs more harsh. Southern vigilance against "contamination" reached its highest point in Georgia in 1927 and Virginia in
1930 when these states passed laws requiring all citizens to register
with the state and identify which "race" they belonged to. In both
states "a single drop of Negro blood" disqualified a person from
marrying a "white person".
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF MISCEGENATION LAWS
In 1932 there were thirty states which forbade interracial marriages. In 1951 there were twenty-nine such states. Today there are
twenty-three. Six states have the restriction expressly stated in
their constitutions. 31 All the statutes prohibit Negro-white marriages, but some include other races such as Malayans, Mongolians,
American Indians, Hindus, Mestizos, Chinese, and Japanese. The
highest courts of only twelve states have ever decided the question
of the constitutionality of these laws. Only a California decision remains on the books declaring such a law to be in contravention to
the Constitution.3 2 The United States Supreme Court has never
on the question although they have had opportunity to do
passed
33
so.

Pace v. Alabama34 is sometimes cited as upholding the constitutionality of laws prohibiting intermarriage between races. This case
dealt with the statutory punishment for fornication between a Caucasian and a Negro. The Court upheld the statute on the theory that
both races were equally treated although the punishment was greater for interracial relations than the punishment for the same act between two members of the same race. The reasoning in Shelley v.
Kraemer35 probably overrules Pace since that case holds that the
equal protection clause applies to individuals and not to races. Additionally, Pace did not concern itself with the right to marry a per30 In the Louisiana territory it seems that concubinage of a white man and a Negro slave was
prohibited, but the practice was so common that a law was passed providing that if a man have
a child by such a slave and be not already married then she was to be a freewoman and remain
his wife. See Woodson, op. cit. supra note 22, at 338.
31 Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. See Appendix I.
32 Prez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). Evidently Alabama had a "carpet-bag"
Supreme Court in 1872 when they declared their miscegenation law unconstitutional. Their decision
was later overruled in 1877. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
33 In In re Monk's Estate, 48 Cal. App.2d 603, 120 P.2d 167 (1941) the Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal on the around that the record did not show that the appeal was applied for within the
time provided by law. 317 U.S. 590, rehearing denied 317 U.S. 711 (1942). The Court denied
In
certiorari of Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So.2d 114 (1954) in 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
Naim v. Naim, 297 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955) the Court upon appeal remanded to state court,
350 U.S. 891, for further findings of fact. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to send
the case down to the trial court because they had no procedural rules by which they would remand
a case after the court's decree affirming the judgment became final. 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849
(1956). The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from this action on the ground that no
federal question remained. 350 U.S. 985 (1956). This seems incorrect. The state court's action was
in direct conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's order that "the judgment of the said Supreme
Court of Appeals in this cause be, and the same is hereby, vacated." (The order is quoted in 90
S.E.2d at 849.)
34 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
35 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

SEKns-lEnJon- ConPoA11T|OD SEALS- ALPINE 5-3422

DICTA

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1961

son of one's choice, but was limited to the question of inequality of
punishment for fornication which is admittedly within the state's
power to proscribe.
There are a few lower federal court decisions upholding state
miscegenation laws.36 The rationale of the decisions of state courts
37
(1)
upholding these laws can be grouped into three main theses:
that miscegenation is against the law of Nature, God, etc.3 8 ; (2) there

is no race discrimination because the statute applies to both races
equally 39 (no court has said all races are treated equally since nearly
every statute leaves out one or more of the commonly accepted races
36 In r* Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6,550) (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871) upholding a Georgia statute;
Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cos. 602 (No. 7,825) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) upholding a Virginia statute;
Ex parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699 (No. 5,047) (C.C.W.D. Texas) upholding a Texas statute; State
v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890) upholding a Georgia statute; Stevens v. United States,
146 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1944) upholding an Oklahoma statute.
37 All the latest decisions are grouped in the next three footnotes. Other state supreme courts
have reviewed miscegenation statutes but did not expressly rule on the question of constitutionality.
Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So.2d 140 (1948); In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129
P.2d 217 (1942); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1887); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483
(1924) were cases where the constitutionality was not questioned by the appellant. In State v.
Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 233 (1959) the statute prohibited both cohabitation and marriage of
Negroes and Caucasians. The defendants were charged with cohabitation, but the court in dictum
discussed the constitutionality of the marriage clause.
38 "And surely there can not be any tyranny or injustice in requiring both alike, to form this
union with those of their own race only, whom God hath joined together by indelible peculiarities,
which declare that He has made the two races distinct." Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877).
it is not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to suffer men to
" .
follow the low of races established by the Creator himself, and not to compel them to intermix
contrary to their instincts." State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (1871).
39 Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942); Scott v. State,
39 Ga. 321 (1869); In re Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 Pac. 911 (1921); Naim v. Naim, 197
Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
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of mankind); and (3) discrimination because of race40or not, racial
purity is a legitimate object of the state police power.
In the California case of Perez v. Lippold41 the court, in a fourto-three decision striking down the California statute, gave an excellent discussion of the question. Since the statute denied a person
a privilege merely because of race, it could be upheld only if it were
directed at some social or biological evil. The court examined the
findings of scientists and could find no such evil. Therefore, there
was a denial of equal protection. Also, the statute was thought to be
too indefinite since it failed to define the method of ascertaining to
which race a given individual of mixed blood belonged.
Although there has been a great amount of interbreeding between Caucasians and Negroes in this country, most of it occurred
before this century as the result of illicit relationships. Today interracial marriage is probably distasteful to the vast majority of
both Negroes and Caucasians. However, there are still those few
people who are unjustly convicted for merely marrying a person of
their own choice, sometimes knowing they are of two different races
and occasionally oblivious to the fact. 42 Two sections of the Con-

stitution suggest that these convictions and rulings are unconstitutional.
43

A. Full Faithand Credit Clause
Although many states have recognized, either by statute or case
law, the validity of marriages that were valid where contracted, although contrary to miscegenation laws of the forum, there are at
least seven states which do not. 44 If the couple leave the forum in

order to evade the marriage laws and then return, it has been repeatedly held that the forum is under no duty to recognize the marriage. 45 The general rule that a marriage is valid everywhere if
valid where made has at least three exceptions: polygamous marriages, incestuous marriages, and those marriages so opposed to state
public policy that the court should not recognize them. It has been
suggested
that miscegenetic marriages come within the last excep46
tion.

The fact that there are many miscegenation laws which vary so
widely as to what is prohibited under the term "miscegenation" is
strong evidence that the right of certain married couples in other
states to move freely throughout the Union is severly threatened.
The right to move freely throughout the states is a right guaranteed
40 State v. Pass, 61 Ark. 57, 121 P.2d 882 (1942); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977
(1895); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877) reaffirmed in
Francois v. State. 9 Tex. 144 (1880). In State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883), the court gave
this reason: "It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and a white
woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny,
and such a fact sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and
whites, laying out of view other sufficient grounds for such enactments." This "fact" is complete
fiction. See Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth 128 (1948) for a discussion of the findings of
geneticists.
41 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (sometimes cited as Perez v. Sharp).
42 See note 9 supra where defendant was held to be a Negro even though he and his family
had always assumed they were Caucasians.
43 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and iudicidl
Proceedings of every other State." Art. IV, § 1, U.S. Constitution.
44 Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Some of these states
recognize such marriages if the parties never moved to the forum end the only issu. is whether
the marriage is valid far purposes of intestacy. See Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So.2d 140
(1948); Caballero v. Executor, 24 La. App. 573 (1872).
45 See cases annotated in 3 A.L.R.2d 240 (1949).
46 State v. Bell, 7 Tenn. 9 (1872).
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to citizens of the several states under Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution. 47 Additionally, it is a privilege of citizens of the na48
tional government as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment.
It would seem that the restrictions imposed by miscegenation laws
are unconstitutional if they attempt to control the marital status of
couples married outside the jurisdiction.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
Invariably it has been the Equal Protection Clause 49 in the
Fourteenth Amendment which the courts have relied on to declare
that laws which discriminate according to race are unconstitutional.
In the Slaughter House Cases50 the Equal Protection Clause was
narrowly construed by the Court's prediction that it would only be
applicable to situations where legislation was unfair to the Negro
race. Although the Equal Protection Clause has subsequently expanded to nullify all kinds of unreasonable discrimination, the
Court's decision is valuable in that it illustrates the historical necessity for the Fourteenth Amendment. It was enacted primarily to
take care of the Negro's powerless position in the South. 51
At first glance one might construe the provision "nor shall any
State . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-

tection of the laws" to mean that an individual is entitled merely to
equal procedural facilities in the courts. Clearly this would not be
a substantial amendment to the Constitution since unequal substantive law could be used as a weapon by racial supremacists to circumvent the principle of equality. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Mr. Justice Matthews set the matter straight by declaring that "The equal
'52
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
Equality was demanded in all public law and in the administration
of the law.
There was no indication by the Supreme Court that there could
be absolutely no legislation which treated special groups in a special
manner. In the Slaughter House Cases the Court denied any inference that the Privileges and Immunities Clause meant that a
status quo in all public law at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment must be maintained, as it was necessary that they recognize
the states' power to enact laws which might burden one class of citizens rather than all. 53 The only requirements were that the purpose

of the law be within the proper scope of what has been recognized
as the police power and that the classification set up by the law to
bring about the desired objective be reasonably related to the end
desired. This is often interpreted by the courts to require that those
similarly situated be similarly treated. 54 It is not enough that the
persons affected by the law have those characteristics which iden47 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 547 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1823).
48 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
49 " . ..
N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Constitution, Art. XIV, § 1.
5083 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
51 For a history of this amendment see tenBroeck, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, (1951).
52 128 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
53 "Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits .... Regulations for these purposes
may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to
impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little individual
inconvenience as possible, the general good." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
54 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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tify them as belonging to a certain class-and thus be treated as
those similarly situated-but they must also possess those characteristics which are subject to state regulation under the police power.
Logically, it would also mean that those who do not possess the mischievous characteristics should not be included within the defined
class. This is not always possible and so the courts have compromised and asked that the classification be as reasonable as possible
under the circumstances. Thus there may be many intelligent people under the age of twenty-one who are mature enough to vote, and
yet it is reasonable that the class of persons under that age be precluded. It would be too burdensome, too "unreasonable" to require
that the state separate minors into "mature" and "immature" classes
by giving them a battery of tests.
The presumption of constitutionality generally applies to laws
which are attacked as being a denial of equal protection. 55 This presumption is not indulged in when a racial classification is set up by
a state law. On the contrary, it appears that the presumption is that
the statute is invalid. At least the Court has stated that such classification is "constitutionally suspect."56 Racial classification has been
struck down in school segregation
laws,57 public recreational facili59
ties,58 and transportation.
In summary, the Equal Protection Clause demands these requirements for discriminatory legislation: (1) the classification as
set up by the statute must be reasonably related to bring about the
ends desired, (2) the ends desired must be within the proper scope
of the state police power, and (3) the state has the burden of showing the reasonableness of using race as a classification.
C. Reasonable Classification
There is perhaps one exception to the requirement of reasonable
classification. Where a law aims at a particular evil but hits only
one particular group of persons, and by its own terms does not cover
all persons having the same anti-social characteristics, the law may
55 Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904); Keokee Consolidated Coke Co.
v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
50 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). And see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) and Hiirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (dictum in both cases).
57 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
58 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), affirming 220 F.2d 386
(1955).
59 Goyle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming 142 F. Supp. 707 (1956).
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be said to be "under-inclusive."" ° It would seem that such classification is not equal protection by the law; but the courts may, nevertheless, uphold the statute on the theory that since no innocent people will be affected by it, the fact that some socially harmful persons will be left untouched by the statute will not be a reason for
the courts to strike it down. Mr. Justice Holmes was perhaps the
first to articulate this rule of constitutional law in a case where the
Court upheld a Texas statute which prohibited railroads from allowing certain types of noxious grass to go to seed on their right-ofway. 61 As to the argument that other property owners were not
subject to the law, Holmes responded, "It would have been more
obviously fair to extend the regulation at least to highways," but
"When a state legislature has declared that in its opinion policy requires a certain measure, its action should not be disturbed by the
courts under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require
'62
with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched.
Thus even this doctrine of "under-inclusiveness" has its breaking
point. Where there is no fair reason for excluding a class of persons
who should by common sense be included then the court will find
the classification to be purely arbitrary and thus unreasonable.
Two cases which have been decided by the Supreme Court
which do not involve miscegenation (but which have a bearing on
the problem as we shall later point out) illustrate the "breaking
point." In Buck v. Bell 6 3 the Court upheld a statute which provided

for sterilization of feeble-minded patients at the state mental hospital. The statute provided for a special hearing where evidence as
to the nature of the patient's disease is presented by the state and
opportunity for the patient's guardian to rebut the allegation that
there is a danger that the condition could be transmitted to the future offspring of the patient. As to the argument that many hereditarily feeble-minded persons would escape the purview of the law
because they are in private institutions or cared for at home, Mr.
Justice Holmes, again speaking for the Court, responded, "But the
answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does all that
it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks
to bring within the
lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as
64
its means allow.
In a later case, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 5 the Court decided that
the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was a denial of
equal protection. The statute condemned to sterilization all criminals who has been convicted two or more times on felony charges
involving moral turpitude, for the purpose of preventing the transmission of inheritable criminal tendencies to future generations. For
some reason the legislature excepted from the definition of a felony
"those offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws,
revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses." The Court found
the exception for embezzlers to be highly arbitrary, that there was
60 See Tussman and tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, for an
excellent analysis of this type of law and the Equal Protection Clause in general.
61 Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904),
62 Id. at 269.
63 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
64 Id. at 208.
65 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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no fair reason why embezzlers should not be included. "We have
not the slightest basis for inferring that that line of distinction [between larceny and embezzlement] has any significance in eugenics
nor that the inheritability of criminal traits follows that neat legal
distinction which the law has marked between those two offenses." 66
It would seem that the same reasoning would have resulted if
the Oklahoma statute, instead of classifying all felonies and then
making an exception for embezzlement, had merely stated separately all possible felony crimes and then left out of the list the crime of
embezzlement. The exception would still be there, but not explicitly, and the Court could have argued that it was purely arbitrary
that embezzlers were left out and that, therefore, the whole statute
was invalid.
The usual type of miscegenation law prohibits marriage between a member of the Negro race and a member of the Caucasian
race (usually called "white people" in the statute). A few of the
laws mention "Orientals," "Mongolians," and an even smaller number mention Indians and Malayans. Racial classification depends
largely upon which anthropological textbook one reads. Some anthropologists classify man into five races: Black, White, Yellow,
Red, and Brown. Others give only three race stocks: black or Negroid, white or Caucasoid, and yellow (or yellow-brown) or Mongoloid.6 7 If we take the latter as the simplest classification, then we
find that only five miscegenation laws mention all three races.68 It
is doubtful that the term "Mongolian" includes the American Indian
to the average person or even to the courts, 69 although it does to
anthropologists who follow the three-race classification. However,
if we assume that it does have that meaning in the law, then there
are still eighteen miscegenation laws which have failed to cover all
the situations where racial purity could be endangered. It is just as
arbitrary to exclude certain races from the terms of the statutes as
it was in the Skinner case to exclude "embezzlers." Assuming that
miscegenation is biologically dangerous to future generations as the
proponents of these laws claim, then upon what reasonable grounds
can it be said that one or more races can be excepted from the terms
of the miscegenation law? It is just as easy to mention the Indians
and the Orientals as it is to mention the Negroes and Caucasians.
Perhaps the defenders of the statutes would argue that in these
states there is no problem as to members of those two races because
there are very few persons of those races within the states. But the
Court in the Skinner case did not rest its decision on the fact that
there were a large group of embezzlers in Oklahoma, but because,
categorically, there was no fair reason to include people convicted
66 Id. at 542.
67 Kroeber, Anthropology 141 (1948) gives a history of race classifications.
68 Mississippi, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Missouri. Arizona's use of the term "Mongolian"
probably does not 'include Indians since the statute originally included that term specifically, but
was dropped in 1942. If we take the five-race (or even a four-race) clossification, then none of
the statutes could be said to mention them all.
69 In U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), the Court in interpreting a naturalization
law declared a high caste Hindu of full Asiatic Indian blood not to be a "white person" as far
as naturalization was concerned. "What we now hold is that the words 'free white persons' are
words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of. the common
man, synonymous with the word 'Caucasian' only as that word is popularly understood. As so
understood and used, whatever may be the speculations of the ethnologist, it does not include the
body of people to whom the appellee belongs." at 214-215.
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of larceny but exclude persons convicted of embezzlement. Besides,
70
the statistics do not uphold the argument except in the deep South.
This seems to be a classification which is unfair and is aimed at
only two particular races-the Orientals in some of the states and
the Negroes in all the states which have these miscegenation laws.
When classification is concerned with fundamental rights such as
the right to marry and have children, shouldn't the courts be very
strict in the definition of "reasonable classification"? This was exactly the situation in the Skinner case, dealing with sterilization of
felons. The Court said, "We are dealing here with legislation which
involves one of the most basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of
'71
the [human] race."
In matters of tax law and property law, the doctrine of "underinclusiveness" may save a statute from being declared unconstitutional, but when the doctrine involves a pseudo-scientific statute
based on the assumption of inheritance of bad genetic combinations,
the Court is very careful to protect individual rights and it will require the legislation to treat equally all those who are similarly
situated. It will not do to arbitrarily leave out certain races of men.
"When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not
the other, it has made an invidious discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. 7 2
As we shall discuss later, there are many decisions which state that
any racial classification is immediately suspect; in fact, since the
Segregation Cases,7'3 which overruled the "separate but equal doctrine," there no longer remain any Supreme Court decisions which
uphold classification based on race in any state laws. Aided by this
70 A few examples: Arizona places no restrictions on Indian-Caucasian marriages, but does on
Negro-Caucasian marriages, and yet there are over twice as many Indians as Negroes in the state.
The same is true of Utah, unless the word "Mongolian" includes Indians. Oklahoma forbids only
Negro-Caucasian marriages and yet there are about 55,000 people who belong to other races. In
contrast, Nebraska forbids Oriental-Caucasian marriages and the Orientals compose no more than
00.075% of the population. (Statistics compiled from the 1950 census, World Almanac 1960.)
71 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1952).
72 Ibid.
73 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 597 (1954).
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overwhelming presumption of invalidity of race-type statutes it can
be fairly predicted that statutes which prohibit only some types of
interracial marriage but exclude others would be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
There is another defect in these statutes-in fact in all the miscegenation statutes. Even if they forbid intermarriage between a
Negro and a Caucasian and between a Mongolian and a Caucasian,
they fail to prohibit marriages between Mongolians and Negroes.
If racial interbreeding is dangerous to racial purity, then why are
members of the Caucasian race the only ones protected? The answer is, of course, that when the law-makers think of racial purity
they think only of their own race and by doing this they have revealed the true source of these laws-bigotry.7 4 Certainly a Negro
or an Oriental 75could claim that he was being denied equal protection of the law.

Let us suppose, however, that a statute names the three (or
four, or five) races of man and then proceeds to bar intermarriage
between any of these races. It might seem that this would circumvent the Equal Protection Clause. Such a statute, we submit, is still
unconstitutional for several reasons.
There is a large class of people who are not of pure racial stock.
Estimates of anthropologists and sociologists as to the number of
Negroes having ascertainable Caucasian "blood" vary from
7 6 oneJust
third of the Negro population to as high as three-fourths.
how are these people to be classified? All the statutes unfairly discriminate against "Negroes" and "Mulattoes" because when they define those terms they may provide that a Negro or Mulatto is any78
one with one-eighth 77 Negro blood or any trace of Negro blood.
7
9
Some states do not define the terms. Here again prejudice is seen
74 One Georgia Supreme Court Justice made a revealing remark in a decision which upheld
their miscegenation statute. After declaring that the law was not a denial of equal protection
because it sought to keep both races pure from unnatural offspring that were inferior to both, he
went on and refuted his own rationalization by declaring, "It is sometimes urged that such marriages should be encouraged, for the purpose of elevating the inferior race. The reply is, that such
connections never elevate the inferior race to the position of the superior, but they bring down
the superior to that of the inferior. They are productive of evil, and evil only ...
....
Scott
v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869). Does not the court admit that the low was designed to protect
the "superior" white race only?
A more recent exomole is to be found in State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882, 884 (1942)
where the court explained, "The evident purpose of the miscegenation statute was to prevent the
named races, to wit, Indians, Negroes, etc. from mixing their blood with the blood of the white
man and such purpose is lawful." 121 P.2d at 884.
75 North Carolina has a law (See Appendix I) which clearly violates the idea of equality before
the low: Negroes are prohibited from marrying Cherokee Indians of Robeson County, but no other
Indians. For the interesting story behind this law that dates back to the early 16th century, see
Stephenson, G. T., Race Distinctions in American Law 90-91 (1910). In Arizona the legislature went
so for as to define a MWjatto in such terms that he could not marry anyone. This was pointed
out by the court in State v Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942) and that year the legislature
changed the law by dropping the prohibition against interracial marriage with Indians. As it
stands now, a Mulatto in Arizona can marry an Indian; but if he should marry a Negro. a Caucasian,
or another Mulatto, he would be violating the law. For the change in the law see Arizona Laws
1942, 1st S.S., ch. 12, § 1.
76Reuter, The American Race Problem 58-60, 126-133 (1927), and Herskovitz, The American
Negro 60-62 (1928).
77 Ten states. Some of these provide that anyone of Negro descent to the third generation is
a Negro. See, Appendix I.
78 Four states. See Appendix I.
79 Nine states. See Appendix I
Proof of race in state courts is a many splendored thing.
Missouri has provided by statute the method of putting the individual on the stand and letting
the jury decide his race from his appearance. Mo. Ann. Stat. (1953) § 56.3.240 The fact that
the individual associates with Negroes may make him one in North Carolina. Hopkins v. Bowers,
111 N.C. 175, 16 S.E. 1 (1892). In Texas the fact that a woman "looks like a white woman" has
been held insufficient evidence to prove it. Moore v. State, 7 Tex. App. 608 (1880).
In one case
a Filipino had to appeal to the California Court of Appeals to find out whether he was a Mongolian. It was decided he was a Malayan and not a fiongolian. Rolidan v. Los Angeles County,
129 Col. App. 267, 18 P 2d 706 (1933).
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to be the basis of miscegenation laws and such laws are unreasonable and arbitrary in their classification. If racial purity is the goal
of these laws then why do they allow a "pure Negro" to marry a
person who is seven-eights Caucasian and only one-eighth Negro?
D. Is Racial Purity a ProperObjective of State Laws?
Even if the statute confined marriages of "pure Negroes" to
"'pure Negroes" and marriages of "pure Caucasians" to "pure Caucasians," etc. and provided that all persons of mixed bloods could
marry only among themselves, a very paradoxical result would
arise. By strictly confining members of pure races to themselves,
there is created a new race-the Hybrids. If pure Negroes and pure
Caucasians are forbidden to intermarry on the theory that it will
produce an inferior offspring, then we have a clear case of racial
prejudice being the sole motivation of the law. For, if the Hybrids
are now classified as a race unto themselves, then a legislature is
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to pass a law which is
aimed at that particular race on the theory that it is inferior to
other races.
The words of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is true are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored
race-the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them distinctively as colored-exemptions implying
inferiority in civil society... and discriminations which are
steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race.8 0
When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated,
and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based
on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the
Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a
"two-class theory"-that is, based upon differences between
"white" and "Negro."81
Offspring of these marriages are being discriminated against because cf their race before they are even born. It is no answer to say
that this is excusable because unborn children have no rights and
do not constitute a race. The truth of the matter is that there are
at least four million Mulattoes in the United States today and our
hypothetical statute implies that they are a biologically inferior race
of people 82 The children of a Caucasian and a Negro are genetically
of the same "mixture" as the children of two true Mulattoes and yet
the begetting of children of the first couple is prohibited by law.
This is a clear case of a statute being founded on a belief of race
.superiority.
That this whole discussion may seem over-mathematical shows
that the 'raditional conception of race is based on the false illusion
80 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879).
,1 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S

475, 478 (1954).

82 "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."
Hiraboyashi v.
United States, 320 U.S 81, 100 (1943).
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of the existence of pure genetic stocks. Many people cannot be
classified into the so-called race "types." They may not even be
Mulattoes, or quadroons, or octoroons. There are some people who
have Caucasian, Negro, and Indian ancestry. There are some people in this country who were born in Hawaii who may have Polynesian, Caucasian, Japanese, and Filipino forefathers. Many people
do not know to which "race" their forefathers belonged. Indeed,
very few of us have records of genealogical history that go further
back than a few generations. It is submitted that no law can be
designed which can apply equally to individuals similarly situated
and at the same time satisfy the theory that nonamalgamation of
races is best for all people. If we could start mankind over again,
the racists' arguments might be valid. As it is now, everyone is but
a conglomeration of many antique races8 3 and the Negro and Caucasian races have already interbred8 4to a high degree since the first
slaves were brought to this country.
Some courts have upheld miscegenation laws on the theory that
they promote public morality 5 and health.8 6 It can hardly be said
that miscegenation is immoral without implying that one of the
races is inferior to another. This so-called morality is the same motive behind the school segregation laws which the Supreme Court
has struck down. It is the same excuse which has been made for
every discriminatory legislation against Negroes and other minority
groups. To allow miscegenation laws to stand on such a claim would
be conceding that laws can be passed which primarily result in.
nothing but keeping alive racial prejudice. The Fourteenth Amendment "was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color. 8' 7
As to the argument that these laws are within the police power
to promote and preserve the health of the people, there is no evidence that members of different races are somehow allergic s s to one.
another or that their offspring will be physically inferior. We will
83 "With respect to race-mixture, the evidence points unequivocally to the fact that this has
been going on from the earliest times.
Indeed, one of the chief processes of race formation and
r-ce extinction or absorption is by means of hybridization between races or ethnic groups. Furthermore, no convincing evidence has been adduced that race mixture of itself produces biologically bad
effects ...
" Statement on Race, UNESCO, statement 13, drawn up by a committee of the world's

outstanding scientists on the subject.

84 See in general, Reuter, The Mulatto in the United States (1918)
85 "The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both races . . . require
that they should be kept distinct and separate ....
" Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. 858, 869 (1878).

86 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); Blake v. Sessions, 99 Okla. 59, 220 Pac. 876 (1923).
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97 Railway Moil Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1944).
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later review the authorities on this matter. As a consensus we can
take the following statement made by a committee of prominent
geneticists, psychologists, anthropologists, and medical doctors for
UNESCO:
Furthermore, no convincing evidence has been adduced
that race mixture of itself produces biologically bad effects.
Statements that human hybrids frequently show undesirable traits, both physically and mentally, physical disharmonies and mental degeneracies, are not supported by
the facts. There is, therefore, no biological justification for
prohibiting intermarriage between persons of different
ethnic groups.8 9
In many instances miscegenation laws actually promote greater
hybridization of genetic stock since anyone who has enough Negroid
characteristics to be considered a Mulatto cannot marry a white person even though he may be seven-eights Caucasian. As Mr. Justice
Jackson remarked, "There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments
at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers
of a minority."90
E. The PresumptionAgainst Racial Classification
There is another and even stronger argument against miscegenation laws which is also based on the Equal Protection Clause. The
Supreme Court has stated that classifications based solely on race
are "constitutionally suspect." 91 Indeed, there are many cases in
which the Court struck down a statute because on its face it set up
a racial classification. 92 After Brown v. Board of Education93 removed the "separate but equal"' doctrine from constitutional law,
every former decision by the Supreme Court which upheld classification by race in a state law has been impliedly overruled.9 4 This
is so because Brown v. Board of Education has been the case on
which the Court later relied in striking down segregated public
facilities in fields outside of education. 95
There are only two cases which could be said to remain as good
precedent for racial classification and both of them deal with federal power as opposed to state power. Both cases demonstrate that
racial classification is constitutionally suspect since the Court excused the decisions on the ground that the federal war power was
involved and should not be interfered with by the courts unless the
abuse is clear and without good reason. In Hirabayashi v. United
States8 a special curfew order that was issued soon after World
89 Statement on Race, UNESCO, statement 13.
90 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) concurring opinion at 546.
91 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See aIso Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)(dictum in both cases).
92 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (municipal ordinance); McCabe v. Atchison
T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
93 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
94 A possible exception might be Pace v. Alabama, supra note 34.
95 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), reversed and remanded
in light of the Segregation Cases, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Lonesome v. Maxwell, 220 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1955) off'd per curiam sub nom. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955);
Detiege v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958), off'd 358 U.S.
54 (1958); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), voc'g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955). These
cases all dealt with public recreational facilities. As for transportation (intrastate) see Browder v.
Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ("we think that Plessy v.
Ferguson has been impliedly, though not explicitly overruled," 142 F.Supp. at 717).
96 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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War II broke out applied only to Japanese on the west coast. The
Court upheld the order and pointed out that the danger of espionage
and sabotage to our military resources was imminent and that the
curfew order was an appropriate measure to meet it. The Court
declared:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has been held to be a denial of
equal protection ....

We may assume that these considera-

tions would be controlling here were it not for the fact that
the danger of espionage and sabotage in time of war and of
threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to
scrutinize every relevant fact 9 7bearing on the loyalty of
populations in the danger areas.
The other case also dealt with Japanese during the war. In
Korematsu v. United States98 the Court upheld by a six-to-three decision an executive order for the evacuation of all Japanese from
the west coast for the purpose of removing any danger of espionage
and sabotage. The Court said:
It should be noted to begin with that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that the courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can. 99
The Court then explained why it thought that this was not racial
antagonism:
Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a
case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice ....

Korematsu

was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are
at war with the Japanese Empire.100
Thus the Court is demanding a pure motive on the part of the federal authorities. Although it is questionable whether the War Department's motive was pure, i.e., whether it was exercised without:
some influence of racial prejudice, 10 1 it must be remembered that
the Court has always been reluctant to censor military orders in
time of war. From the above statements taken from the two cases:
it would appear that not even Congress could pass a miscegenation
law for the District of Columbia or a territorial possession unless it
could be shown that it was enacted free of racial antagonism
and'
1 2
there was a pressing public necessity for such a law.
It would seem from all the foregoing that there is a strong presumption that any statute which sets up race as a classification is
97 Id. at 100.
98 323 U.S. 214 (194).
99 Id. at 216.
100 Id, at 223.
101 See footnotes in 323 U.S. on pp. 236, 237, 241 in the dissenting opinion.
102 Where racial classification in federal law was held a denial of due process,
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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unconstitutional. A case in point is Oyama v. Californiawhere the
Court was confronted with a California statute that raised a presumption of violation of an alien land law (i.e., ineligible aliens were
forbidden to own land) when the consideration was paid by an ineligible alien for a transfer of land to a citizen or eligible alien. The
appellant was an American citizen whose father was a Japanese
citizen not eligible for naturalization. The father paid for land
transferred to the son and the trial court held that since the presumption had not been overcome by Oyama his land escheated. The
United States Supreme Court ruled that Oyama was denied equal
protection of the law because the statutory
presumption applied to
10 3
him only because of his racial descent:
There remains the question of whether discrimination
between citizens on the basis of their racial descent, as revealed in this case, is justifiable. Here we start with the
proposition that only the most exceptional circumstances
can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the
equal protection clause and a federal statute giving all
citizens the right to own land ....

[A] ssuming, for the pur-

pose of argument only, that the basic prohibition is constitutional, it does not follow that there is no constitutional
limit to the means which may be used to enforce it. In the
light most favorable to the State, this case presents a conflict between the State's right to formulate a policy of landholding within its bounds and the right of American citizens to own land anywhere in the United States. When
these two rights clash, the rights of a citizen may not be
subordinated
merely because of his father's country of
104
origin.
Whether this means that the burden of showing the reasonableness of racial classification is on the state is not entirely clear, but
103 The Court speaks of "race" at one point and "country of origin" at another. It is not clear
which the Court regarded as denying the appellant equal protection. The terms are of course not
synonymous. That one of the two concepts was the defect in the statute is clear, though. The
decision was not based on the theory that the presumption was a denial of due process in that
it was arbitrary, because it distinguished this case from Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925),
in which the same presumption was upheld against a non-descendant of the ineligible alien who
paid the consideration.
104 332 U.S. 633, 646-7 (1948).
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in Bolling v. Sharpe, in which the Court reviewed a school segregation law in the District of Columbia, it said, "Classification based
solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."'10 5 The statute was held unconstitutional even though there
was no evidence submitted by the complainant that the statute was
was based on the reasoning in Brown v.
unreasonable. The decision
Board of Education'0 6 which was decided the same day and in which
the Court apparently took judicial notice of the findings of psychologists and sociologists. After the Court stated that separate
facilities in schools have a tendency to inculcate feelings of inferiority in the Negro child which in turn affect his motivation to learn,
it added, "this finding is amply supported by modern authority" and
then cited in a footnote psychological and sociological studies. It is
significant that the Court applied this finding (that separate facilities are inherently unequal) to all four of the cases that were deeven though only
cided under the title Brown v. Board of Education
07
two of the lower courts so found as a fact.
Another argument that the presumption is against the validity
of a statute which uses race as a criterion is the number of holdings
that have struck down laws which are innocent on their face10 but
8
discriminatory in their application. In Patton v. Mississippi a
Negro had been convicted by an all white jury. The Court received
evidence that there was a large percentage of the local population
that was Negro but that no Negroes had ever been called for jury
duty. The state court had shown that one must be a qualified voter
before he can be called for jury service, and that only one out of
400 voters was a Negro, even though one out of three citizens was a
Negro. The trial judge's rationalization was that the jury commissioner was not discriminating against Negroes, but rather that Negroes did not have the proper qualifications as determined by election laws. The Court rejected this argument and held that the
statistics for the past thirty years had made a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. "But whatever the precise number of qualified colored electors in the county there were some; and if it can
possibly be conceived that all of them were disqualified for jury
service by reason of the commission of crime, habitual drunkenness,
gambling, inability to read and write or to meet any other or all of
the statutory tests, we do not doubt that the state could have proved
it." 10 9 Thus the presumption is that any law is a denial of equal protection which in its application treats people differently because of
their race. The burden is upon the state to show that the law as
applied is necessary to promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community. Other cases have held that a prima
105 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
106 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107 For the view that the finding was not a "finding of a fact" in the traditional sense but what
may be called a "legislative" one, such as courts always must make in assessing general social or
economic conditions as a basis of constitutional low decision, see Greenberg, Social Scientists Take
the Stand - A Review and Appraisal of Their Testimony in Litigation, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1956).
108 332 U.S. 463 (1948).
109 Id. at 468.
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facie case has been made110
when circumstances similar to those in the
Pattoncase were shown.
If the burden is upon the state to show the reasonableness (or
somehow explain the prima facie case) of racial classification in the
application of a statute, then it would seem that a fortiori there is a
prima facie case of discrimination when the statute on its face treats
one person differently than another solely because of his race. Indeed, most such statutes have been held unconstitutional without
even discussing the possibility that the state could come forward
with evidence to explain the reasonableness of such a classification."' Is not a miscegenation law "a statute which on its face
treats one person differently than another solely because of his
race"? Suppose that A, a white male, and B, a Negro male, both
wish to marry Z, a Negro female. The law allows B to marry her
and will protect him in all those rights that accompany marriage,
but A is not given that protection. A is denied equal protection
merely because of his race.
This seems simple enough, but it is surprising to see how many
courts avoid this fact by asserting that since each race is similarly
treated, the statute gives them equal protection. It is easy to argue
in such terms until one is reminded that races do not marry, only
individuals marry, and that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
individuals, not to racial groups. 112 Thus in Shelley v. Kraemer'13
the Court, in response to the argument that restrictive covenants
could be enforced against the whites as well as against the Negroes,
declared, "The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The
rights established are personal rights. It is, therefore, no answer to
these petitioners to say that the courts may also be induced to deny
white persons rights of ownership and occupancy on grounds of
race or color. 11 4 The Court dealt with the right of an individual to
own and occupy property. This was considered a matter of individual choice. The Court held that a person cannot be denied this
choice merely because white neighbors object. The same has been
held as to the right to follow a chosen trade. 115 So it should be held
with marriage. Marriage has been regarded by the Court as one of
the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 It is true
that reasonable regulation of marriage has always been recognized
as within the police power of the state." 7 State law can prohibit
what the legislature regards as incestuous marriages and can limit
the choice to individuals who are above a certain age and mentally
and physically capable of founding a family. But these restrictions
110 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Avery v.
State, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880). Where the
discriminatory application has been declared unconstitutional per se without any reference to a prima
facie case see Smith v. Allwriqht, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hale
v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
111 See cases cited in note 92 supra.
112 "

. . . nor shall any State . . . deny to any person . . . the equal

protection of the laws."

113 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
114 Id. at 22.
l5Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
116 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (dictum).
117 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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are not based upon racial lines. Miscegenation laws are, and therefore are immediately suspect.
The fact that there is a danger that in some Southern states
white persons may stage riots in protest of an interracial marriage
is no ground for contending that the state should have the power
to prohibit such marriages. The Supreme Court has definitely declared that individual rights that are protected by the Constitution
cannot be denied because there are local prejudices that refuse to
recognize those rights. In dealing with a city ordinance which prohibited Negroes from living in a white neighborhood the Court said,
"This drastic measure is sought to be justified under the authority
of the state in the exercise of the police power. It is said such legislation tends to promote the public peace by preventing racial conflicts, that it tends to maintain racial purity; ...[T] he police power,
broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinancel8 which
runs counter to the limitations of the Federal Constitution.""1
Since Brown v. Board of Education, the Court has maintained
the rule that no segregation of races by state law in any kind of
public service is constitutional.' 1 9 This case overruled the doctrine
of "separate but equal facilities" which had been formulated in the
1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson.120 It would be tempting to argue
that this must impliedly affect the validity of all miscegenation
laws. There is, however, admittedly a difference between segregation in schools, buses, and recreational facilities and laws which
prohibit intermarriage. The segregation laws affected many people
in their everyday movements. Segregated public schools touch every Negro child. It is a social phenomenon that Negroes in America
resent. Miscegenation laws, however, deal only with those relatively few cases where individuals go against the community mores and
attempt to enter into an interracial relationship which is admittedly
unpopular to both Negroes and whites alike. There is less demand
for liberty here by large groups of people than in education and job
opportunities.12 1 It is significant that the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People filed briefs in all the recent
segregation cases as amicus curiae, but apparently has taken no interest in recent miscegenation cases that have gone to appellate
courts. In the segregation cases the Court talked in terms of races
and whether Negroes were being discriminated against en masse.
They pointed out the bad social effects it would have on the Negro
children and how separated facilities would retard any chance of the
children to gain acceptance on an equal level with whites. A mis118 Buchanon v. Worley, 245 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1917). Under a plan of gradual desegregation of
schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, public hostility and threats of mob violence forced the federal
government to send troops to insure protection of the Negro children. The school board petitioned
the District Court in June, 1958, to suspend the. op~ration of the desegreqation program for two
years due to public turmoil. The request was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme
Court affirmed and held that public opposition could not deprive Negroes of their constitutional
rights. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
119 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control,
347 U.S. 971 (1954); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Tureaud v. Board
of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955); Mayor and
City of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955);
Board of Trustees of Univ. of N. Carolina v. Frasier,
350 U.S. 979 (1956); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
120 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
121 Negroes seem to demand the following social equalities (in order of decreasing preference):
(1) economic activities such as land ownership, jobs; (2) legal rights in courts; (3) political rights;
(4) use of public facilities on a non-segregated basis; (5) personal relations, eating, dancing, etc.,
with whites; (6) intermarriage and sexual relations with white people. 1 Myrdal, An American
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy 60, 61 (1944).
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cegenation law does not affect large groups of people since relatively few persons have the desire to marry with a person of a different race. There is nothing about the nature of man that demands
this taste for his own race; it is an American problem which has its
roots in our particular social history.
Still the precise legal issue in the segregation cases was whether an individual was being denied equal protection of the laws. It
is apparent then that the difference between the two situations segregated schools and miscegenation laws-is a matter of degree
and not a difference of kind. The Court has held racial classification unconstitutional even when the Court was aware that at the
time there was little demand by Negroes in general for equal facilities. Thus, a railroad coach law which permitted carriers to provide
sleeping and dining cars only for white persons was a denial of
equal protection, notwithstanding the fact there was little demand
by Negroes for Pullman and dining car service. The Court remarked of such argument, "It makes the constitutional right depend
upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against,
where22as the essence of a constitutional right is that it is a personal
one."

As a summary of the constitutional aspects of miscegenation
laws we can say that the burden is upon the twenty-three states
which now have them to show by competent evidence that they are
necessary to the health of the community and are not outgrowths
of the same racial antagonism that engendered school segregation
laws. Is there such evidence? If there is, will it match other evidence which can be produced to show that there is no sound scientific basis for such laws? And even if the Supreme Court later declares that their holding in Bolling v. Sharpe that race laws are
"constitutionally suspect" did not mean that the presumption of
validity no longer attaches, is there any evidence of which the Court
can take judicial notice, as they did in Brown v. Board of Education,
that such laws are scientifically indefensible?
IV.

THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF MISCEGENATION

12 3

A. PhysiologicalEffects of Race-Crossing
Many studies have been made attempting to reveal inherent
defects in the process2 4of amalgamation of races. R. R. Gates, a biologist, wrote a book 1 in 1929 which has been widely cited to uphold the theory of racial purity. He postulated that each race of
man is actually a separate species and that some are more advanced
than others in terms of biological evolution. He did not say that all
race-crossing was to be avoided. Only when an "advanced" stock

and a very "primitive" stock interbreed do serious malefactors arise.
He said, "The racial elements of the more primitive stock will dilute
and weaken the better elements of the more progressive stock, with
a retarding or degrading effect on the progressive stock as a whole.
It is, therefore, clear that miscegenation between, for example, the
122 McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914).
123 For an excellent discussion of the scientific aspects of miscegenation, see Wirth and Goldhamer,
The Hybrid and the Problem of Miscegenation in Characteristics of the American Negro 253-370 (Klineberg, ed. 1944).
124 Gates, R.R., Heredity in Man (1929).
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white races and the African races-which for ages has been undergoing separate evolution-is wholly undesirable from a eugenic
viewpoint."'' 2 5

Gates does not show by statistics that such has oc-

curred. His only justification is that Mulattoes in the United States
are not socially as successful as whites. This has been shown by
many studies to be 1due
to their inferior education, job opportuni26
ties and social status.

Furthermore, leading anthropologists deny that there is yet any
evidence justifying the notion that some races are more advanced
biologically than others.'2 7 The leading student of the evolution of
man, Franz Weidenreich, has said of Gates' theory that each race
is a separate species of animal: "Raising the differences between
racial groups to the rank of specific differences by giving those
groups specific names is nothing but an attempt to exaggerate the
dissimilarities by the application of a taxonomic trick.' ' 28 Anthropologists are fond of refuting the idea that Negroes are laggards in
the evolutionary process by comparing the physical traits of Negroes, Caucasians, and apes. They point out that apes are very hairy
on the body, Caucasians are less hairy, and Negroes are the least
hairy. Apes have very thin lips, Caucasians thicker lips, and Negroes the thickest of them all. The epidermus of the ape is chalk
white, Caucasians are slightly more pigmented, and Negroes are
dark. The hair on the head of an ape is straight, the Caucasian has
straight or wavy hair, and the Negro has kinky or woolly hair. Some
persons have tried to demonstrate that Negroes have inferior mental equipment because their average brain size is smaller than the
Caucasian's. 1"9 This argument backfires when it is pointed out that
the Negro "Kaffirs" and Amahora of Africa, the Japanese, the
American Indians, the Eskimos and the Polynesians all130 have brains
which are on the average larger than the Caucasian's.
An outspoken opponent of race mixture was Davenport who
made a study of race-crossing between whites and Negroes in Jamaica.131 He compared the hybrids with the whites and Negroes in
every conceivable way. He came to the conclusion that the arms
and legs of Negroes are longer in proportion to their trunks than
the whites and that the hybrids seemed to inherit these long legs
but the shorter arms of the Caucasians. He claimed that this was
an unnatural disharmony. Other scientists studied his findings and
thought results were plainly exaggerated-that his own statistics
showed that the order of difference in total stature was not more
than one inch,13- and the most that could be said of this was that
the half breed would be put to a slight disadvantage in picking
things up from the ground. Most scientists considered the study to
125 Id. at 329.
126 The most thorouqh studies are Klineberg: Race Differences (1935); Negro Intelligence and
Selective Migration (1935); Mental Testing of Racial and National Groups, Scientific Aspects of the
Race Problem 251-94 (1941); Race and Psychology, The Race Question in Modern Science 55-84
(UNESCO 1956). See also Characteristics of the American Negro (Klineberg ed. 1944).
127 1 Myrdal, op. cit. supra note 121, at 138, 1t3.
128 Weidenreich, Apes, Giants, and Man 2 (1946).
129 See for instance Bean, Some Racial Peculiarities of the Negro Brain, 5 American Journal of
Anatomy 353-415 (1906). Prof. Franklin P. Mall in whose laboratory at Johns Hopkins this research
was conducted was so dissatisfied with the interpretation of the evidence that he was led to investigate the problem for himself. Mall, the leading anatomist of his time, came to the conclusion that
nothing at all had been proved. See Montagu Man's Most Dangerous Myth 225 (1952).
130 Far a table of cranial capacities, see Montagu, An Introduction to Physical Anthropology 33637 (2d ed. 1951).
131 Davenport and Steggerda, Race Crossing in Jamaica (1929).
132 Castle, Race Mixture and Physical Disharmonies, 71 Science 603-06 (1930).
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show no disadvantage in miscegenation, despite the claims of Davenport.133 Castle remarked, "The honestly made records of Davenport
and Steggerda tell a very different story about hybrid Jamaicans
from that which Davenport. .. tells about them in broad, sweeping
statements. The former will never reach the ears of eugenics propagandists and Congressional committees; the latter will be with us
as the 134
bogy-man of pure-race enthusiasts for the next hundred
years."
Several studies of mixed blood groups lend support not only
to the argument that no harm results of mixed marriages, but that
there may even be some biological advantage in being the child of
such a marriage. These studies are, on the whole, more recent than
the study made by Davenport and Steggerda which was claimed to
show bad results. 1 35 Probably the most interesting case history of
cross-breeding was of the descendants of the mutineers of the famed
English ship The Bounty. The mutineers settled on Pitcairn Island
in the South Pacific with Polynesian women in 1790. Isolated from
the world for over a century except for rare visits by explorers,
this colony flourished magnificently. The descendants, who are still
living there, have always had unusually long life-spans and are
taller, more vigorous, and on the whole healthier than the original
settlers. Schapiro, who has studied them, 136 thinks that although
environmental factors may have contributed largely to the increased
vitality of the people, hybridization itself may have played a part.
The average generation averaged 7.44 children per family, the second generation 9.10, and the third, 5.40. The rate in the second generation is one of the highest on record for any community and reflects an unusual reproduction level.
The community is free of any race tensions since all were of
mixed strains after the first settlers died out, and the people are
133 Ibid. See also Krober, Anthropology 200-01 (1948); Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit. supra note
123,, at 328.
134 Castle, op. cit. supra note 132, at 606.
135 See, e.g.. Boas, Race, Language and Culture 138-48 (1940), a study of "half-breed" Indians
show that the hybrids were taller and more fertile than the parental stocks. Fischer, Die Rehobother
Bastaards (1913) similar findings as to descendants of Dutch and Low German peasant mixture with
Hottentot women in South Africa. These two racial stocks are very dissimilar and if disharmonies
were ever likely to occur, it would be here. The descendants were well proportioned, taller, and
more fertile than the parents. Lotsy and Goddijn, Voyages of Explorations to Judge of the Bearing of
Hybridization upon Evolution (I. South Africa), 10 Genetica viii-315 (1928) showing favorable results
of race crossing among Bushmen, Basontas. Mongoloids, Caucasians and others. Pourchet, Brazilian
Mestizo Types, V Handbook of South American Indians 111-20 (1950) and Freyre, The Masters and the
Slaves (1946); both studies are of the mixed bloods of Negroes, Indians and Caucasians in Brazil.
Keesing, The Changing Maori (1928), race crossing in New Zealand. Adams, Interracial Marriage in
Hawaii (1937). Krauss, Race Crossing in Hawaii, 32 Journal of Heredity 371-78 (1941).
136 Schapiro, H. The Heritage of the Bounty. The story of Pitcairn through six generations (1936).
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unusually peaceful. Crime is a rare occurrence. A democratic rule
developed early with all men and women enjoying equal political
rights, long before political rights were granted to women in the
western world. All children were required to attend school until
the age of sixteen.
The most important works on the physical characteristics of
American Negroes and Mulattoes are by Day 137 and Herskovitz.138
Although the purpose of their studies was not to prove or disprove
the danger of miscegenation, they found, incidentally, that there
was no sign of evolutionary retrogression in Mulattoes or decrease
in fecundity.
Geneticists agree with the foregoing findings by anthropologists. The works of Dunn and Dobzhansky 139 may be summarized
thusly: (a) miscegenation has existed since the beginning of human
life, (b) miscegenation results in greater somatic and psychic variability and allows of the emergence of a great variety of new gene
patterns which are more easily adapted to new environments, (c)
biologically speaking, miscegenation is neither good nor bad, although there is evidence in some cases of hybrid vigor, (d) an overwhelming number of modern geneticists refute the theory that miscegenation causes retrogression.
B. Mentality of Racial Hybrids
Let it be said from the outset that very little work has been
done in the field of psychology on the question of intelligence of
Mulattoes. Most of the following discussion will of necessity deal
with studies that include Negroes and Mulattoes compared as a
group with the whites' performance on the mental tests.
Klineberg has demonstrated that the inferiority of the average
Negro in mental tests results from social environment which is
largely deleterious to Negro children except possibly in certain large
cities in northern states. 140 This was demonstrated, for instance, in
World War I (comparable studies were not made in World War II)
when aptitude tests were given to inductees and the scores were
correlated with race. The average Negro from Ohio scored higher
than the average white person from any one of the Southern
states1 41 Thus, if we take a Negro and compare his score with a
white from another part of the country, there is revealed the strong
influence that one's socio-economic surroundings play in his mental
alertness. Klineberg's later work 142 on this subject fully confirmed
the indications of the Army tests. To guard against the element of
selective migration-i.e. "the smart Negroes went north and left
the dumb ones behind"-Klineberg took the scores of Negro children after they had recently moved to the North. There was no
difference between their scores and the Southern Negro children's
137 Day, C. B. A study of Some Negro-White Families in the United States, 10 Harvard African
Studies (1932).
138 Herskovitz, M. The Anthropometry of the American Negro (1930).
139 Dunn, L. C. and T. Dobzhansky, Heredity, Race and Society (1951). See also Boyd, W. C.
Genetics and the Race of Man (1950).
140 Klineberg, Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration (1935);
Peterson, Mental Measurement
Monographs No. 5 (1929).
141 See Appendix IIl.
142 Klineberg, op. cit. supra note 140.
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scores. Then, in an extensive battery of tests, he showed that the
longer the children lived in northern cities the higher they scored.
With only minute deviations, his results showed a close relationship
between mental test scores and length of residence in the favorable
environment. 14 3 He makes the cautious statement that "even under
these better environmental conditions Negro children do not on the
average quite reach the white norms. Since the environment of the
New York Negro child is by no means the same as that of the white,
except perhaps as far as schooling is concerned, this result does144
not
prove that the Negro is incapable of reaching the white level.
Early studies by Ferguson 145 showed a pronounced correlation
in Mulattoes' scores between the degree of white blood and mental
scores. The same correlation was found of half-breed Indians. The
results were interpreted by many to demonstrate that whites possessed a greater inherent mental capacity than Indians and Negroes,
and thus was transmitted genetically to the mixed blood group. 146
Klineberg's more careful investigations show that it is equally possible to account for the correlation by the fact that mixed bloods
have a higher socio-economic position in society than full blooded
Indians and Negroes. Of course, any argument that it is the Negroes' own fault that they have a lower status is totally unrealistic.
They were originally brought into a strange culture against their
will and had no opportunity to benefit from the advantages of the
advanced civilization as long as they had no legal rights as slaves.
Since the emancipation of the slaves, it is rarely that whites have
given them any positive help to improve their social environment.
And it is a mistake to believe that western civilization was more
advanced because it was composed of Caucasian peoples. Culture
does not depend on race. Any historian can readily recall examples
in antiquity where leading cultures of yesterday were composed of
people who today are of relatively less advanced countries. Egypt
and Greece are the prime examples.
In the World War I Army examinations, some attempt was
made to separate the scores of Negro recruits into those of darkerskinned and lighter-skinned subgroups, the latter containing those
estimated to be Mulattoes or less than one-half Negro. The lightcolored groups scored about 50, the dark-colored groups only 30.147
The consensus seems to be that this is largely due to environmental
influences. Kroeber explains how this may have come about:
But the Mulattoes of slavery days were likely to be
house servants, brought up with the Master family, absorbing manners, information, perhaps education; their black
half-brothers and half-sisters stayed out in the plantation
shacks. Several generations have elapsed since those days,
but it is probable that the descendants of Mulattoes have
143
144
145
146
147

See Appendix II.
Klineberg, op. cit. supro note 110, at 59.
Ferguson, G. 0. The Psychology of the Negro, Archives of Psychology, No. 36.
Garth, Race Psychology (1931).
Kroeber, op. cit. supro note 133, at 198.
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kept a step or two ahead of the descendants of the pure
blacks in literacy, range of experience and the like. It is
well known that modern American Negroes tend to accord
higher status among themselves to the lighter-skinned
Caucasian-featured individuals. Successful Negroes tend to
marry light-colored spouses. A light skin and a convex
nose count for almost as much as a good education or successful parents-both among Negroes themselves in their inand in getting jobs or other opporternal social cleavages,
148
tunities from Whites.

It is clear, anyway, that the racists' claim that miscegenation
produces children inferior to both parental groups has absolutely
no foundation in fact. Not only are the children's physical characteristics intermediate between the Negro and Caucasian characteristics, but their mental test scores lie between the respective
norms.
C. Personality Traits
149

have contended that the fact that there is a soSome writers
cial stratification in the Negro culture whereby Mulattoes are a
somewhat distinctive group, leads to tension in the Mulatto's life
which is manifested by a higher degree of mental illness than
among the darker Negroes. There is no evidence to support this
theory, however. One possibility of testing this contention was attempted by a sociologist who studied the relation of insanity and
Negro neighborhoods in Chicago. 150 He found an inverse ratio between insanity rates and the neighborhood economic level. Since the
Mulattoes occupy the upper levels of the economic scale it would
seem that they would have lower insanity rates.
The suggestion that Mulattoes have a higher rate of criminal
activity has been challenged by a study similar to the one above.
Frazier found that in Chicago there was an inverse relation between crime rates and the socio-economic status of the neighborhood. Since he also found that more Mulattoes live in the better
is any truth in the contenneighborhoods, it is unlikely that there 151
tion that they tend towards criminality.
White supremacists reveal an inconsistent hypocrisy when they
first defend miscegenation laws on the ground that it will prove
harmful to both races and when they try to explain how it is that
some Negroes have achieved noteworthy success in professional,
scientific, and artistic fields. Their stock explanation here is that
the successful ones are successful because they have some white
blood in their veins. If they back down part of the way and say
that miscegenation lowers only the standards of the white race,
then they have admitted that the laws are based on the theory that
the white race is superior and must be protected regardless of indi'idual liberties.
148 Id. at 199.
149 See for example, Stonequist, E. V., The Marginal Man (1937).
150 Rosenthal, Racial Difference in the Incidence of Mental Disease,

Journal of Negro

Education

484 (1934).
151 Frazier, The Negro Family in the United States (1939).
results, Crime and the Man (1939).
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To demonstrate that Mulattoes have achieved a high status in
the Negro population, Reuter took compilations of Negro leaders
from various history books, biographical encyclopedias, Who's Who,
etc. Through interviews and investigation he determined which
ones were Mulattoes. For the purpose of his study Reuter defined a
Mulatto as "a Negro with sufficient admixture of white blood to
readily distinguish him from Negroes of pure stock." His figures
show that of the persons listed, there was one black to fourteen
Mulattoes in the various biographical reference books, and one black
to nine Mulattoes in selected history books.1 52 Although estimates
of the number of Mulattoes in America vary widely, it is clear that
they do not outnumber full-blooded Negroes by such ratios. Although Reuter earlier accounted for this superiority in achievement
because of genetic differences, 153 he later changed his viewpoint and
recognized the importance of social and economic advantages of the
Mulatto which have been present since before the Civil War.154 For
instance according to the 1850 census, 581 of every 1000 free Negroes
were Mulattoes, and only 83 of every 1000 slaves were Mulattoes.
The significance of Reuter's study for our purposes is the definite
showing that Mulattoes are not social outcasts of both white and
Negro people. There are absolutely no grounds for the argument
that offspring of interracial marriages will suffer because they are
not of "Pure" Race.
V.

CONCLUSION

The dignity of a democratic people cannot reconcile itself with
the invidious concept of bigotry. Our Constitution does not tolerate
statutes and decisions which tend to maintain an unwarranted
dominance by one race over others. The day has not yet come, however, when an American can hold his head high when he hears that
this is the land of the free. Sooner or later he will. Sooner or later
all laws which flaunt the democratic ideal will be abolished. Eventually, we predict, our Supreme Court will declare miscegenation
laws unconstitutional. We remain-only waiting for the word, only
hoping for the time.
152 Reuter, The Mulatto in the United States 212, 245 (1918).
153 Reuter, Race Mixture, Studies in Intermarriage and Miscegenation 129-163 (1931).
154 Id. in a later chapter, "The Hybrid as a Sociological Type" at 183-201.
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APPENDIX 1

Persons Affected
Penalties
State and Citations
Alabama. Const. art. 4, § 102
Any descendant of a Negro can- 2-7 years.
Ala. Code, tit. 14, § 360 (19 40) not marry a white.
Negro, Mongolian, Malay, Hin- None
Arizona, Rev. Stat. § 25-101
du cannot marry a person with
(1956).

Arkansas, Ark. Code, tit. 55,
§§ 104, 105, 110 (1947).
Delaware, Del. Code Ann., tit. 13,
§§ 101, 102 (1953).
Florida, Const. art. 16, 24. Fla.
Stat. §§ 741.11, 741.12, 1. 101
(1957).
Georgia, Ga. Code §§ 53-1 06.214,-312,-9903; 79-103
(1947).

Indiana, Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 44104,-105,-107,-209; 10-42 22
(1952).
Kentucky, Kent. Rev. Stat.
H8 391.100: 402.020,-040,- 990
(1956).
Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. ch. 14,
art. 79; ch. 9, art. 201 (195 0).

Caucasian blood. (Notice that
this means that a Mulatto can
probably only marry an Indian)
See change in statute: Ariz. Laws
1942, 1st S.S., ch. 12, § 1.
Negroes and Mulattoes cannot
marry whites.
Negroes and Mulattoes cannot
marry whites.
Any person of 1/8 or more Negro blood cannot marry a white
person.
No one can marry a white who
has any ascertainable trace of Negro, African, West Indies, Asiatic
Indian, Malayan, Japanese. or
Chinese blood.
Any person of 1/8 or more Negro blood cannot marry a white,
A Negro or Mulatto
marry a white person.

cannot

Caucasian and Negro cannot
marry if they have knowledge of
difference' in race. Indian and
Negro cannot marry.

Maryland, Md. Code Ann., art. Marriage forbidden between (1)
whites and persons of Negro de§ 398 (1957).
scent to 3rd generation, (2)
whites and Malayans, and (3)
Malayans and persons of Negro
descent to 3rd generation.
Mississippi, Const. art. 14, § 2 63. Persons of 1/8 or more Negro
Miss. Code §§ 2000, 20002,
blood and persons of 1/8 or
more Mongolian blood cannot
2339 (1952).
marry a white person.
Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat.
Any person of 1/8 or more Ne§451.020 (1949).
gro or Mongolian blood cannot
marry a white person.
Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat.
Any person of 1/8 or more Ne§§44-103, 42-117, 42-328
gro, Japanese, or Chinese blood
(1949).
cannot marry a white person.
Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat.
Any person of Ethiopian or
black race, Malay or brown race,
§ 122.180 (1959).
or Mongolian or yellow race
cannot marry a member of Caucasan or white race.
North Carolina, Const. art. art. Any person of Negro or Indian
descent to 3rd generation cannot
14, § 8. N. Car. Gen. Stat.
marry a white person. Negroes
§ 51-3 (1950).
are prohibited from marrying
Cherokee Indians of Robeson
County

Misdemeanor
$100 fine or 30
days.
Up to 10 years or
$1000 fine.
1-2 years.

Up to 10 years
and/or $500$5000 fine.
3-12 months
and/or $500$5000 fine.
Up to 5 years of
hard labor. No
penalty for Indian-Negro marriage attempt.
18 months- 10
years.

Up to 10 years
and/or $100 fine.
Up to 2 years
and/or $100 fine.
Up to 6 months
and/or $100 fine.
Misdemeanor

4 months - 10
years and/or fine
for white-Negro
marriage, but no
penalty for Negro-Indian marriage.
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Oklahoma, Const. art. 23, § 11.
Okl. Stat. §§ 43-12,-13
(1954).
South Carolina, Const. art. 3,
§ 33. S. Car. Code
§§ 20-7,-8 (1952).
Tennessee, Const. art. 11, 14,
Code Ann. §§ 36-402,-403
(1956).
Texas, Vern. Civ. Code § 4607;
Vern. Penal Code §§ 492, 493
(1950).
Utah, Code Ann. § 30 A-1
(1953).

Persons Affected
Any persons of African descent
cannot marry anyone but themselves.
Persons having 1/8 or more Negro blood, and Indians, and
Mestizos cannot marry a white.
Persons of Negro descent to 3rd
generation cannot marry a white
person.
Any person of African descent
to 3rd generation cannot marry
a white person.
Any Negro, Mongolian, Malayan, Mulatto, Quadroon, Octoroon cannot marry a white person.
Virginia, Code §§ 1-14, 20-54, Persons with any ascertainable
trace of Negro blood cannot
-57,-58 (1950).
marry a white person. A "white
person" is one who has no trace
of non-Caucasian blood except
1/16 or less American Indian
blood.
West Virginia, Code Ann.
Negroes cannot marry whites.

1961

Penalties
1-5 years and up
to $500 fine.
1-5 years and up
to $500 fine.
1-5 years
2-5 years

None

1-5 years

Up to $100

and

1 year.
§§4701, 4086, 4697 (1955).
Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-18, Negroes, Mulattoes, Mogolians, $100-$1000
and Malays cannot marry a and/or 1-5 years.
20-19 (1957).
white person.

Appendix II*
Klineberg's statistics of the development of New York City Negro children born in the
South who moved North.
Average I.Q.
Years in New York City
72
I or 2
76
3 or 4
84
5 or 6
92
7 or 8 or 9
92
Born in the North
*Source: a summary of statistics found in Klineberg,

Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration (1935 ).

Appendix II*
Army Comprehensive Alpha Test Scores

Whites
State :
Arkansas
Mississippi
North Carolina
Georgia
Louisiana
Alabama
Kentucky
Oklahoma
Texas
Tennessee
South Carolina

Negroes

Median score
35.60
37.65
38.20
39.35
41.10
41.35
41.50
43.00
43.40
44.00
45.05

State:
Ohio
Illinois
Indiana
New York

Median score
45.35
42.25
41.35
38.60

*Sources: Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth

161 (1952).
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BOOK REVIEWS
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Spencer L. Kimball.1
Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. Pp.
340. $6.00. Documented editor, $7.50.
"Insurance and Public Policy" is the fine fruit of a scholarly
study of primary legal-source materials of the state of Wisconsin
from 1835 to 1959 concerned with the insurance enterprise. The materials studied by the author include statutes having a bearing on
insurance law, all insurance bills introduced but not enacted, legislative journal references, including the governors' messages, all legislative committee reports, all insurance cases decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or federal court system which are based upon
Wisconsin litigation, all attorney generals' opinions upon insurance
questions, and all the material on insurance accummulated by the
Wisconsin legislative reference library. The reader discovers quite
early why Wisconsin was chosen. Wisconsin's insurance history was
influenced by both the rural and urban, the manufacturing and
agrarian, thereby typifying the central and midwestern states.
These factors, coupled with the early socialism of the Progressive
Party in Wisconsin, has furnished an excellent backdrop upon which
the author depicts the social, economic and legal interplay of the
insurance business which results in a constant changing public policy affecting this industry. The author describes in great detail the.
insurance principle and enterprise, moving from a position near the.
periphery of the nineteenth century life ministering primarily to.
the needs of economic man, into the twentieth century, becoming
the main instruments of underwriting and guaranteeing security
for the members of a welfare-minded society. He pictures for us
the constant ebb and flow of the development of public policy
which brings the regulation of the insurance industry into conformance with the demands of the times.
From a very early date the industry was regarded as a business
affected with the public interest. The once meager governmental
regulation of the town and county mutual insurance programs, part
of the mere subsistence economy of pioneer days, has been expanded to cope with the great capital mobilization of modern day interstate underwritings.
Professor Kimball's analysis and explanation of conflicts and
struggle of state control and regulation of insurance is always objective. Yet, the reader may ask himself if the ordinary processes
of evolution are such that the social and judicial recognition of insurance as interstate commerce does not portend federal regulation
of the industry to satisfy the public policy needs of the latter part
of the twentieth century.
The book is available with or without documentation. The fully
documented edition includes forty-five pages of notes invaluableto the researcher. Those lawyers whose work is closely allied with
the legislative, administrative and judicial control of the insurance
industry will find this work an excellent source of material from
I

Professor of Law, University of Michigon.
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which they may learn in depth and breadth the historical and social source and significance of many of today's legal decisions and
regulatory practides.
Hamlet J. Barry, Jr.*
FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES. By Dr. Harlan B. Phillips."
New York: Reynal and Co., 1960. Pp. 310. $5.00.
In 1953 Professor Phillips began a series of recordings with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter. These tape-recorded interviews, stimulated by
the provocative questions of Professor Phillips, evoked from the
Justice some very revealing and human comments on the events in
his life up to the time he was appointed to the Supreme Court bench
in 1939. It had been intended originally to postpone publication for
a number of years. The Justice, however, was persuaded to allow
publication now when some of his incisive descriptions would be
much more in point.
Mr. Frankfurter has given us in this book some very interesting
conversation, which tells us something of his life, his opinions, and
his considered reflections on the men whose lives touched his.
Born in Vienna he came to New York with his parents at the
age of twelve. He completed City College and then went on to Har*Attorney at Low, Denver, Colorado.
1 Professor in the Oral History Research Office, Columbia University.
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vard Law School, which has become for him one of his demigods.
In later years he tended to judge most people by whether they had
gone to Harvard.
For only the briefest time after graduation from Law School
did he serve in a law firm. Otherwise, he has been engaged in serving in governmental agencies on the federal level, teaching in Harvard Law School, teaching at Oxford for a Sabbatical year, and
serving on the Supreme Court during the last 21 years.
One of his early heroes was Henry L. Stimson, who took him
into his office as United States Attorney, in the days when Teddy
Roosevelt was in the White House. From Mr. Stimson he learned
great respect for the responsibility of a prosecutor, and avoided always badgering and persecuting those who happened to be in the
clutches of the law.
During the First World War he served as law officer in the office of the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, and had special responsibilities whenever labor troubles developed. One member of
that conciliation commission was Colorado's Verner Z. Reed. Mr.
Frankfurter helped with a number of labor tensions throughout the
West which involved him in championing the cause of Tom Mooney
in the celebrated case that agitated California for many years.
He was a disciple of Brandeis and Holmes in many ways. He
followed up the Brandeis Brief in the Muller case, of maximum
hours of work for women, by arguing the Bunting case before the
Supreme Court which contended the same thing for men. He was
also associated with the Attorney General of Oregon in arguing the
O'Hara and Stettler cases regarding minimum wages for women.
These were all landmark cases in liberalizing the attitude of the
Court in social legislation.
In the midst of the furor over the Sacco-Vanzetti case, Justice
Frankfurter wrote an article on their defense in the Atlantic Monthly, which was later published in book form, that brought him into
open opposition to President Lowell of Harvard, Dean Wigmore of
Northwestern Law School and many others.
He was offered and refused a position on the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, and as Solicitor General of the United
States. When President Franklin Roosevelt invited him to succeed
Justice Cardoza on the Supreme Court he accepted readily. He attributed his ready acceptance to the timeliness of the appointment.
It was 1939 and would be hailed throughout the world as an instance of America's democratic approach to a Jew.
When he went on to the Court he was considered one of theradicals. It is a remarkable commentary on the fast pace of our
society that today he is one of the more conservative members of
our Supreme Tribunal.
This book reads very easily. One has the delightful feeling of
listening to a great man talk, and of being both inspired and entertained.
Dr. Manuel Laderman*
-Rabbi of the Congregation Hebrew Educational Alliance, Denver, Colorado.
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BELLI LOOKS AT LIFE AND LAW IN JAPAN. By Melvin M.
Belli1 and Danny R. Jones.2 Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. 311. $395.
As the title suggests, and unlike other Belli endedvors, this work
does not intend to present a documented "how to do it" law book,
but is instead a general introduction to Japan, its history, its life,
people, sentiments, and law. The book can be enjoyed by layman
and lawyer. It is the first "of a series of studies intended to hold
the mirror up to man living under his various laws and customs
around the globe."
A considerable portion of the book is devoted to the forces of
history, religion, customs and folklore that have influenced the development of the Japanese legal system. Japanese law is a mixture
of Confucian philosophy, adaptations from Continental Codes, and
the influence of the American occupation forces, principally reflected in the McArthur Constitution of 1947. The writ of habeas corpus,
the privilege against self-incrimination, and other "democratic"
safeguards familiar to most Americans, but not usually a part of the
Civil Law, have been implemented into Japanese law. Differences
in culture and economic conditions have produced laws and attitudes at variance with those that govern lives in America. Combinations (Zaibatsu) that would violate the Sherman Act in America are not only permitted in Japan but encouraged. Offenses
against property are dealt with more severely than offenses against
the person, there being a greater abundance of life than property in
the Orient (Japan's population is approximately 90,000,000 in an
area about the size of Wyoming). The Oriental "saving face" attitude is a compelling inducement for litigants to settle a dispute
whenever possible to avoid the "embarrassment" of a public trial.
The role of the begoshi (barrister), kujishi (solicitor) and Japanese
courts and prisons in Japan's administration of justice is vividly described. An entire chapter is devoted to the recent and controversial Girard trial and another to the case against Tokyo Rose.
Several chapters exclusively treat life in Japan-"from kisses
to sukiyaki"-much to the comfort and enjoyment of any prospective tourist or armchair traveller. A "touristic" atmosphere mindful of a Fodor's guide book is provided by forty-four enjoyable
photographs of Japanese scenes and life. The discussion of the
Geisha (pronounced Gay-sha) will shatter many Western stereotypes regarding her role in Japanese life.
In this world of misunderstanding it is important to let the
heads and shoulders of different races and religions touch and be
understood if a peaceful solution to world disorder and distrust is
to be realized. The authors have taken a commendable stride forward to bring greater insight and ethnic understanding to a gifted
nation and its people. Their style of writing is not legalistically dull
but is flavored with the necessary tinge of story telling that makes
for easy and interesting reading.
Theodore A. Borrillo*
1 Member of the California Bar Association and of the firm of Belli, Ashe, and Gerry.
2 Member of the Belli firm in Tokyo, Japan.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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OPINION NO. 15
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION, ADOPTED AUGUST 19, 1960
SYLLABUS
1. It is improper for any attorney, firm or group of attorneys to
obtain or utilize any listing in the classified or non-classified sections of the telephone directory, which listing is designed to, or does
in fact, draw special attention to such attorney, group or firm of
attorneys.
2. It is improper to list the individual names of partners and
associates in the telephone directory in a town in which they neither
reside nor maintain regularly scheduled office hours.
FACTS
This opinion is concerned with the propriety of the following
types of telephone directory listings of lawyers, groups or firms of
lawyers.
1. Listings in boldface type in either the classified or the nonclassified section.
2. The use of variations of the firm or group name in either the
classified or non-classified sections, so as to obtain multiple listings
of the same firm or group. For example, a firm or group which obtains separate listings under the names of "Jones, Brown and
Smith", "Brown, Jones and Smith", "Smith, Brown and Jones", etc.
3. The listing, either in the classified or non-classified sections,
of the names of the individual partners, members or associates of a
group or firm of attorneys, under the name of the firm or group,
with or without the office or home telephone or address of such individuals. For example:
"Jones and Smith
Richard Jones
Robert Smith"
4. In either the classified or the non-classified sections of the
directory, using more lines than are necessary in showing the address and telephone number of the attorney, group or firm of attorneys. This includes the following:
(a) Listing the room or suite number in addition to the
office building in which the attorney, group or firm is located, where more than one line is used to show both the
office and the suite number and the building. For example:
"John Jones
Suite 340
Equitable Building"
(b) Listing both the name of the office building in
which the attorney, firm or group is located, together with
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the street address of the building, where more than one line
is utilized for such purpose. For example:
"Jones and Jones
Majestic Building
209 16th Street"
(c) Utilizing two or more lines, where one would suffice
for the listing of the name of the attorney, firm or group,
and the building. For example:
"John Jones
Majestic Bldg."
5. The addition of words in either the classified or the nonclassified section implying or stating a "specialty", whether additional lines are utilized or not. For example:
"John Jones, Tax Attorney"
6. The addition of any descriptive word or words, other than
the name and address of the attorney, firm or group, in either the
classified or the non-classified sections. For example:
"John Jones, District Attorney"
or
"John Jones, Lt., U. S. N."
7. An attorney, firm or group of attorneys obtaining a listing
entirely separate from the general classified listing for other attorneys. For example, obtaining a listing under the heading "Tax
Consultants" in the classified section.
8. A law firm having partners or associates residing in both
Town A and Town B lists in the telephone directory of Town A the
name of the firm, the names of the partners and associates residing
in Town A and the names of the partners and associates residing in
Town B.
OPINION
Canon 27
See opinions 53, 223, 241 (overruling 223), 284 (overruling 241) and
295 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association.
Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides, in part,
as follows:
"It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment
by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations."
The prohibition against advertising by an attorney contained
in Canon 27 is absolute, and admits of no exception. The word "advertise" is defined in Webster's dictionary (among other definitions) as "to call public attention to, especially by emphasing desirable qualities . . ." and "to make conspicuous."

The non-classi-

fied section of the telephone directory is not per se an advertising
medium. I Rather, it is provided by the telephone company as a

JANUARY-FEBRUARY

1961

DICTA

service to the public, and is obviously the only efficient method by
which the telephone numbers of individuals may be easily located.
All of the customers of the telephone company are listed unless
they specifically request that they be omitted. Likewise, the listing
of attorneys under the headings "Attorneys" or "Lawyers" does not
of itself constitute advertising, but instead is an additional directory provided by the telephone company for the convenience of
those using the telephone service, although an additional charge is
made to those customers who request a listing in the classified
section.
Normally, both the classified and the non-classified sections of
the telephone directory are utilized by an individual seeking the
telephone number, or possibly the address, of a specific lawyer already known to him. Ordinarily neither section of the directory
would be used as a law list by someone attempting to select a lawyer. Consequently, the listing of a lawyer's name, address and telephone number in either the classified or the non-classified sections
of a telephone directory does not in itself constitute advertising.
On the other hand, it is possible for an attorney to make use of
the classified and non-classified sections of a telephone directory
for the purpose of advertising. When the format of the attorney's
listing is designed to or necessarily does call particular attention to
the attorney, segregating or distinguishing him from his fellow lawyers, then the listing must be regarded as advertising and unprofessional.
There is an exceedingly fine line between the legitimate listing
and one which constitutes advertising. The criteria of distinction
between a proper listing and unethical advertising are fourfold:
1. Is the listing confined to the name, location and telephone
number of the attorney, or is this information expanded upon
through the use of extraneous descriptive phrases?
2. Does the listing utilize more vertical space in the directory
than is necessary to impart the name, telephone number and location of the attorney?
3. Does the format or design of the listing necessarily cause it
to stand out from the other lawyer-listings in the directory?
4. With regard to law firms or groups of attorneys associated
together, does the firm or group obtain multiple listing through the
use of variations in its firm or group name, or otherwise?

Patronize DICTA
Adver1tisers
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In considering the specific types of listings set forth above it is
arguable that each of the various listings may be used primarily for
the convenience of the established client in locating his attorney.
On the other hand, even though this may be the motivating factor
behind the utilization of a listing of the type described in Paragraphs 1 through 7 under the heading "FACTS", nevertheless, the
ordinary and normal use of such listings is to call particular attention to the attorney, firm or group involved. It is, therefore, the
opinion of this Committee that it is improper to obtain or utilize in
either the classified or non-classified sections of the telephone directory any of the forms of listings set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 7
in the portion of this opinion entitled "FACTS".
With regard to a listing such as described in paragraph 8 under
"FACTS", it is the opinion of this Committee that it is proper for a
law firm having one or more partners or associates resident in
Town A, with the other partners or associates residing in Town B,
to list in the telephone directory of Town A not only the firm name
and the names of the partners and associates residing in Town A,
but also the names of each of the individual partners and associates
who reside in Town B but maintain regularly scheduled office hours
in Town A. Within the limitations previously expressed in this
opinion, the following listings are proper:
a. The listing of the firm name in both Town A and Town B.
b. Listing in the Town A directory the individual names of the
partners and associates who actually reside in Town A, or
who maintain regularly scheduled office hours in Town A.
c. Listing in the Town B directory the individual names of the
partners and associates who actually reside in Town B, or
who maintain regularly scheduled office hours in Town B.
In conclusion it should be mentioned that the Committee on
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, in its opinion
No. 295, has stated that it is permissible for a lawyer to list in addition to his office telephone number an alternate number (which
would probably be his residence number) under the heading "if no
answer call" or "nights, Sundays and holidays, etc." While finding
the practice permissible, however, the Committee opines that "listing numbers to call on nights, Sundays and holidays is not necessary
and approaches commercialism."
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Open Evenings Until 8:00 P.M., Sundays 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

Marsolek's TV Service Center-3539 E. Colfax
DE. 3-1595
Lawn Mowers Sharpened
Bring your Radio and TV to us for repair-90-Day Guarantee
- Open 8:30 to 6:30 Mon. to Sat. -
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OPINION NO. 16
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION, ADOPTED DECEMBER 2, 1960
SYLLABUS
1. A lawyer who appears as court appointed guardian ad litem
in probate, or similar proceedings, and who renders only the services normally required by this office is entitled to a reasonable fee
for his services but not a fee based solely upon the size of the estate
involved.
2. A judge has the duty to review the charges made by his appointees. He should disallow the excessive portion of such charges,
and, where appropriate, censure those who make excessive charges.
FACTS
A lawyer is appointed by the County Court to serve as guardian
ad litem in the estate of a decedent or a mental incompetent. The
lawyer attempts to collect a fee for his services that is dependent
solely on the size of the estate, resulting in a fee in excess of that
justified by the time spent or the responsibility involved.
OPINION
A lawyer has an obligation to assist in the administration of
justice by accepting court appointments of various types. It is axiomatic that the lawyer who accepts an appointment should fulfill the
trust imposed by that office to the best of his ability and with the
utmost dispatch. It is well known that many appointments made by
courts consist only of examining the court file in the matter and
appearing at a hearing which is of short duration. In this type of
appointment, the lawyer's compensation should be based substantially on the time expended, and not on the size of the estate.
When the appointment. requires additional work, the lawyer
should make a reasonable charge commensurate with those services.
The size of the estate might then be one element used in determining what is a reasonable fee. At all times the appointed lawyer
should be scrupulously fair with the court and with the client. The
reason for the appointment is generally to represent the interests
of a person deemed not capable of protecting himself because of lack
of age or lack of mental capacity. To subject such a person to the
additional hazard of protecting his property from the one appointed
by the court to serve that purpose is indeed a miscarriage of justice.
In the final analysis it is the duty and obligation of the judge
making the appointments to approve or disallow the charge for
services made by his appointee. It is an obligation he cannot avoid
since it is clearly a responsibility of his office.
Canon 12, Canons of Judicial Ethics, provides:
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"Trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians and other
persons appointed by a judge to aid in the administration
of justice should have the strictest probity and impartiality
and should be selected with a view solely to their character
and fitness. The power of making such appointments should
not be exercised by him for personal partisan advantage.
He should not permit his appointments to be controlled by
others than himself. He should also avoid nepotism and
undue favoritism in his appointments.
While not hesitating to fix or approve just amounts, he
should be most scrupulous in granting or approving compensation for the services or charges of such appointees to
avoid excessive allowances, whether or not expected to or
complained of. He cannot rid himself of this responsibility
by the consent of counsel."
A judge who refuses to review the charges made by his appointee, to disallow the excessive portion of such charges, and,
where appropriate, to censure those who make excessive charges is
neglecting a duty imposed upon him by law and by the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
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